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ABSTRACT
One of Congress’s early concerns in immigration law was the 
removal of aliens who commit crimes involving moral turpitude. 
Nevertheless, Congress did not address the procedure for identifying 
a crime involving moral turpitude in the Immigration and Nationality 
Act. The omission of this procedure by Congress resulted in federal 
circuit courts formulating their own procedures for identifying a 
crime involving moral turpitude. The disparity between the federal 
circuit court procedures results in the removal of aliens from the 
United States even though those aliens did not commit crimes 
involving moral turpitude. Furthermore, the disparity permits aliens 
who do commit crimes involving moral turpitude to evade removal 
due to loopholes in the varying federal circuit court procedures. 
Attempting to establish a uniform and equitable procedure, 
Attorney General Mukasey articulated a three-part procedure for 
identifying a crime involving moral turpitude. Due to several federal 
circuit courts rejecting Attorney General Mukasey’s procedure and 
due to recent Supreme Court decisions, Attorney General Holder 
vacated Attorney General Mukasey’s procedure and charged the 
Board of Immigration Appeals with determining the procedure for 
identifying a crime involving moral turpitude. Despite its vacatur, 
the BIA should adopt Attorney General Mukasey’s procedure 
because the procedure would (1) be consistent with traditional 
agency deference; (2) demystify the procedure for identifying crimes 
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involving moral turpitude through the creation of a universal 
approach; and (3) avoid manipulations within the criminal system 
with respect to conviction records. Until the BIA adopts Attorney 
General Mukasey’s procedure, aliens will continue to face both 
unequitable treatment and a labyrinth of procedures in removal 
proceedings for crimes involving moral turpitude.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1977, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit painted a 
picture of United States immigration law, noting that the law bears a 
“striking resemblance . . . [to] King Minos’s labyrinth in ancient 
Crete.”1 Cristoval Silva-Trevino (Cristoval) is a recent victim of the 
immigration-law “labyrinth.”2 In 2005, Cristoval sought 
discretionary relief from removal3 through an adjustment of status to 
lawful permanent resident, contending that his “aggravated felony” 
                                                 
1. Lok v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 548 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 
1977).  
 2. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 695 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2008), 
vacated, Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2015) (exposing 
Cristoval to different evidentiary standards throughout his appeal process). A 
labyrinth is “something extremely complex or tortuous in structure, arrangement, or 
character.” Labyrinth, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 
2003).  
 3. The federal government initiated removal proceedings against Cristoval 
based on the Immigration and Nationality Act’s deportability provisions. Silva-
Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 691. Cristoval was subject to deportability provisions 
because he was a lawful permanent resident and because he pled guilty to an 
“aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) 
(2006)). Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the federal government may 
initiate removal proceedings against an alien if the alien is (1) present in the United 
States; and (2) either inadmissible or deportable. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(2) (2012). 
Inadmissibility grounds apply if the alien was not “admitted” into the United States. 
Id. § 1182(a). Deportability grounds apply if the alien was “admitted” into the 
United States. Id. § 1227(a). An alien is “admitted” into the United States if the alien 
enters the United States “after inspection and authorization by an immigration 
officer.” Id. § 1101(a)(13)(A).  
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conviction did not entail a crime involving moral turpitude.4 
Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey (Mukasey),5 noticing the 
inconsistent approaches within the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA)6 and the federal circuit courts, articulated a three-part 
procedure in Silva-Trevino for identifying a crime involving moral 
turpitude.7 Noticing that several federal circuit courts refused to 
apply Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino procedure, Attorney General Eric H. 
                                                 
 4. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 691. Cristoval challenged that his 
crime was not a crime involving moral turpitude because he sought discretionary 
relief from removal based on an adjustment of status, under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), to 
lawful permanent resident. Id. at 691 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)). 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) 
read, and currently reads: 
(a) Status as person admitted for permanent residence on application and 
eligibility for immigrant visa 
The status of an alien who was inspected and admitted or paroled into the 
United States . . . may be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his 
discretion and under such regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an 
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if (1) the alien makes an 
application for such adjustment, (2) the alien is eligible to receive an 
immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent 
residence, and (3) an immigrant visa is immediately available to him at the 
time his application is filed.  
8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2012) (emphasis added). Since the Immigration and Nationality 
Act does not define “moral turpitude,” courts often rely on Black’s Law Dictionary 
to ascertain the meaning of the term. Brian C. Harms, Redefining “Crimes of Moral 
Turpitude”: A Proposal to Congress, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 259, 264 (2001). Black’s 
Law Dictionary defines “moral turpitude” as: 
shameful wickedness – so extreme a departure from ordinary standards of 
honest, good morals, justice, or ethics as to be shocking to the moral sense 
of the community. It has also been defined as an act of baseness, vileness, 
or depravity in the private and social duties which one person owes to 
another, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary 
rule of right and duty between people.  
Moral Turpitude, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (citation omitted). 
 5. Michael B. Mukasey was the Attorney General of the United States 
between 2007 and 2009. Attorneys General of the United States, U.S. DEP’T JUST., 
http://www.justice.gov/ag/historical-bios [https://perma.cc/F9EZ-UDMX] (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2016).  
 6. Immigration Judges, the BIA, and the Attorney General are part of the 
Department of Justice. Drew Marksity, Judicial Review of Agency Action: Federal 
Appellate Review of Board of Immigration Appeals Streamlining Procedure, 76 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 645, 652 (2008). The Immigration Judge makes the initial ruling in an 
immigration proceeding. Id. at 645. The decision of the Immigration Judge may be 
appealed to the BIA. Id. The BIA decision may be appealed to federal circuit court. 
Id. 
 7. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 704.  
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Holder, Jr. (Holder)8 vacated Mukasey’s procedure and charged the 
BIA with determining the proper procedure for identifying a crime 
involving moral turpitude.9 Holder’s vacatur not only tolerated 
federal circuit court neglect of traditional judicial deference to 
agency action,10 but also marked a continuation of the immigration-
law labyrinth.11 
Holder’s vacatur coincides with a line of federal circuit court 
cases rejecting Mukasey’s three-part procedure for identifying a 
crime involving moral turpitude.12 However, the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
have embraced Mukasey’s procedure.13 Consequently, “[a]n alien 
who resides in one circuit might be [admissible] even though he 
committed the same crime as an alien who lives in a different circuit 
and is [inadmissible].”14 In light of Holder’s mandate on the BIA to 
determine the procedure for identifying a crime involving moral 
turpitude, until the BIA articulates a uniform procedure and federal 
circuit courts adopt that procedure, federal circuit courts will 
continue utilizing different procedures for identifying a crime 
involving moral turpitude,15 creating uncertainty for aliens16 facing 
the grave danger of inadmissibility or deportation.17  
Since neglecting Mukasey’s procedure for identifying a crime 
involving moral turpitude undermines the goal of uniformity in 
immigration law and results in ineffective federal circuit court 
procedures that permit aliens to escape deportation despite 
committing crimes involving moral turpitude, the BIA should adopt 
                                                 
 8. Eric H. Holder, Jr. was the Attorney General of the United States 
between 2009 and 2015. Attorneys General of the United States, supra note 5. The 
current Attorney General of the United States is Loretta E. Lynch. Id. 
 9. Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550, 553 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2015).  
 10. See infra Section I.C. 
 11. See infra Section II.C. 
 12. See, e.g., Silva-Trevino v. Holder, 742 F.3d 197, 205 (5th Cir. 2014); 
Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 484 (4th Cir. 2012); Fajardo v. Att’y Gen., 659 
F.3d 1303, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2011); Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 464 
(3d Cir. 2009).  
 13. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Holder, 757 F.3d 712, 718 (7th Cir. 2014); 
Bobadilla v. Holder, 679 F.3d 1052, 1058-59 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 14. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 695 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2008), 
vacated, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550. 
 15. See infra Section II.C. 
 16. An alien is any person who is “not a citizen or national of the United 
States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2012).  
 17. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 695.  
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Mukasey’s procedure.18 Although the BIA’s adoption of Mukasey’s 
procedure would break with the precedent of many federal circuit 
courts, Holder delegated the task of determining the proper 
procedure for identifying a crime involving moral turpitude to the 
BIA.19 In turn, Congress imposes a duty on the Attorney General, not 
the courts, to determine and rule on questions of immigration law 
under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).20 The BIA’s 
adoption of Mukasey’s three-part procedure for identifying a crime 
involving moral turpitude would (1) be consistent with traditional 
agency deference; (2) demystify the procedure for identifying crimes 
involving moral turpitude through the creation of a universal 
approach; and (3) avoid manipulations within the criminal system 
with respect to conviction records.21  
Part I of this Note discusses the background and development 
of moral turpitude in immigration law, focusing on the plenary 
power of the federal government in immigration law, the INA, and 
judicial deference to agency action.22 Part II examines the varied 
procedures of federal circuit courts in identifying a crime involving 
moral turpitude before Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino decision, Mukasey’s 
Silva-Trevino decision, and the reactions of both federal circuit 
courts and Holder to Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino decision.23 Part III 
proposes the BIA’s adoption of Mukasey’s three-part procedure for 
identifying a crime involving moral turpitude and discusses why the 
BIA should adopt this approach.24 
I. EXPLORING THE ROOTS: MORAL TURPITUDE IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAW 
For over a century after the Declaration of Independence, the 
federal government of the United States was largely uninvolved in 
                                                 
 18. See infra Part III. 
 19. Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 553. The Attorney General is 
authorized by the Code of Federal Regulations to delegate determinations to the 
BIA. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1) (2015) (“The Board shall function as an appellate body 
charged with the review of those administrative adjudications under the Act that the 
Attorney General may by regulation assign to it.”).  
 20. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2012). 
 21. See infra Part III. 
 22. See infra Part I. 
 23. See infra Part II. 
 24. See infra Part III.  
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the regulation and enforcement of immigration law.25 Rather, the task 
was left to the states.26 Over time, the federal government began to 
enter and to influence the field of immigration law.27 One of the 
federal government’s early concerns was the admissibility of aliens 
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.28 This concern, 
shaped by the evolving (1) plenary power of the federal government; 
(2) INA; and (3) judicial deference to agency action, continues 
today.29 
A. The Plenary Power of Congress 
The power of Congress to regulate and to enforce 
inadmissibility based on a conviction of a crime involving moral 
turpitude is a subset of the federal government’s plenary power in 
immigration law.30 The power to regulate immigration law is not 
enumerated in the Constitution of the United States; rather, it is a 
power inherent in sovereignty.31 Unlike an enumerated power, which 
provides the judiciary with guidance on whether the alleged 
governmental conduct falls within that enumerated power,32 a power 
inherent in sovereignty provides no judicial guidance on whether the 
alleged governmental conduct falls within the power inherent in 
sovereignty.33 The result is that the federal government has a plenary 
                                                 
 25. Karla Mari McKanders, Unforgiving of Those Who Trespass Against 
U.S.: State Laws Criminalizing Immigration Status, 12 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 331, 
335-36 (2011). 
 26. Id. at 335. 
 27. Id.  
 28. See Julia Ann Simon-Kerr, Moral Turpitude, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1001, 
1045-46 (2012). 
 29. See Pooja R. Dadhania, Note, The Categorical Approach for Crimes 
Involving Moral Turpitude After Silva-Trevino, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 313, 340-47 
(2011) (exploring the different approaches for identifying a crime involving moral 
turpitude). 
 30. See Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local 
Power over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1572 (2008).  
 31. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893) (“The right 
. . . [is] an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation, 
essential to its safety, its independence, and its welfare . . . .”). 
 32. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553 (1995) (acknowledging 
that “limitations on the commerce power are inherent in the very language of the 
Commerce Clause”).  
 33. See Stumpf, supra note 30, at 1572 (recognizing that in immigration 
law, courts “defer almost completely to the decisions of the federal legislature and 
the executive branch”).  
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power in immigration law.34 The plenary power of the federal 
government in immigration law extends to both the exclusion and 
removal of aliens from the United States.35 Despite the great leeway 
the plenary power affords the federal government in immigration 
matters, including matters concerning the procedure for identifying a 
crime involving moral turpitude, the Supreme Court largely left this 
power unbound.36 
The Supreme Court established few limits on the plenary 
power of the federal government in immigration law.37 One limit is 
that the federal government may not exercise its plenary power when 
it exceeds the civil nature of immigration law by imposing criminal 
punishment for immigration-law violations.38 Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court does not consider deportation a criminal 
punishment.39 A second limit is that if an alien is “admitted”40 to the 
United States, then the government’s actions are subject to due-
process41 limitations.42 Despite this due-process requirement, the 
Supreme Court has not defined the amount of due process required in 
                                                 
 34. Id. (defining plenary power as “profound discretion unrestrained by 
constitutional limitations”).  
 35. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 711 (“The right to exclude or to expel all 
aliens . . . [is] an inherent and inalienable right . . . .”); Chae Chan Ping v. United 
States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (“The power of exclusion of foreigners being an 
incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States as a part of 
those sovereign powers delegated by the constitution . . . cannot be granted away or 
restrained on behalf of anyone.”). 
 36. See Stumpf, supra note 30, at 1579-80. 
 37. Id. at 1580. 
 38. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896); Linda S. 
Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference That Alienage Makes, 69 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1097-98 (1994) (“[A]lthough the immigration power is 
extraordinarily broad, it must nevertheless be exercised within its own domain. That 
domain governs matters of admission, exclusion, and deportation; beyond it, the 
alien inhibits the domain of a territorially present persons where different and more 
protective rules against government power apply.”). 
 39. See Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 237 (“No limits can be put by the courts 
upon the power of congress to protect, by summary methods, the country from the 
advent of aliens whose race or habits render them undesirable as citizens, or to expel 
such if they have already found their way into our land . . . .”). 
 40. The INA defines “admission” and “admitted” as “the lawful entry of the 
alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration 
officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2012). 
 41. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution declares that 
“[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 42. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903).  
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immigration proceedings.43 Rather, the Court established that the 
amount of due process required depends on the circumstances of 
each case.44 Furthermore, the Court has traditionally deferred to the 
federal government in determining the amount of due process that an 
alien is afforded.45 These few limits on the plenary power of the 
federal government in immigration law leave the federal government 
with great discretion, little guidance, and limited judicial review in 
articulating the procedure for identifying a crime involving moral 
turpitude during removal proceedings.46  
The federal government possesses a largely unrestricted 
plenary power in immigration matters, which encompasses the 
articulation of the procedure for identifying a crime involving moral 
turpitude.47 The federal government delegated a great portion of this 
largely unrestricted plenary power in articulating the procedure for 
identifying a crime involving moral turpitude during removal 
proceedings to regulatory agencies.48 The scope of the delegation is 
embodied in the INA.49 
B. The Immigration and Nationality Act 
Through the INA, Congress delegated its plenary power50 in 
articulating the procedure for identifying a crime involving moral 
                                                 
 43. Id. at 101 (asserting that due process does not necessarily require “an 
opportunity upon a regular, set occasion, and according to the forms of judicial 
procedure, but one that will secure the prompt, vigorous action contemplated by 
Congress, and at the same time be appropriate to the nature of the case”). 
 44. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (holding that in 
determining the amount of due process required, the Court must balance (1) the 
interest of the individual; (2) the interest of the government; and (3) “the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of [the individual’s] interest through the procedures used, and 
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”).  
 45. See Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 100. For example, in Yamataya, the Court 
stated: 
It is true that [the alien] pleads a want of knowledge of our language; that 
she did not understand the nature and import of the questions propounded 
to her; that the investigation made was a “pretended” one; and that she 
did not, at the time, know that the investigation had reference to her 
being deported from the country. These considerations cannot justify the 
intervention of the courts. 
Id. at 101-02. 
 46. See Stumpf, supra note 30, at 1580. 
 47. Id. 
 48. 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (2012).  
 49. See infra Section I.B. 
 50. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2012). The statute reads: 
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turpitude51 during removal proceedings to regulatory agencies.52 In 
terms of delegated authority, the INA charges the Secretary of 
Homeland Security with its administration and enforcement.53 
Additionally, the INA charges the Attorney General with making 
determinations and rulings on all questions of immigration law that 
“shall be controlling.”54 Although Congress left little guidance on 
what procedure to utilize for identifying a crime involving moral 
turpitude, the history of the INA indicates congressional intent.55 
The history of the INA demonstrates that Congress likely 
intended a fact-based procedure for identifying a crime involving 
                                                                                                       
(a) Secretary of Homeland Security 
 (1) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall be charged with the 
administration and enforcement of this chapter and all other laws 
relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens, except insofar as 
this chapter or such laws relate to the powers, functions, and duties 
conferred upon the President, Attorney General, the Secretary of State, 
the officers of the Department of State, or diplomatic or consular 
officers: Provided, however, that determination and ruling by the 
Attorney General with respect to all questions of law shall be controlling. 
Id. (emphasis added). The statute further provides: 
(g) Attorney General 
(1) In general 
 The Attorney General shall have such authorities and functions 
under this chapter and all other laws relating to the immigration and 
naturalization of aliens as were exercised by the Executive Office for 
Immigration Review, or by the Attorney General with respect to the 
Executive Office for Immigration Review, on the day before the 
effective date of the Immigration Reform, Accountability and 
Security Enhancement Act of 2002. 
Id. § 1103(g)(1) (emphasis added).  
 51. Id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i). The statute reads: 
(2) Criminal and related grounds 
(A) Conviction of certain crimes 
(i) In general  
 Except as provided in clause (ii), any alien convicted of, or 
who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts 
which constitute the essential elements of – 
 (I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely 
political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such 
a crime, or 
 (II) a violation of . . . any law or regulation of a State . . . is 
inadmissible.  
Id.  
 52. Id. § 1103.  
 53. Id. § 1103(a)(1). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Simon-Kerr, supra note 28, at 1058. 
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moral turpitude.56 The first immigration law concerning moral 
turpitude, passed in 1891, rendered excludable “persons who have 
been convicted of a felony or other infamous crime[s] or 
misdemeanor[s] involving moral turpitude.”57 In 1917, Congress 
expanded the moral turpitude standard to deportability proceedings.58 
The intent of Congress, in terms of the procedure for identifying a 
crime involving moral turpitude, becomes clearer after an 
examination of the legislative history of the 1917 Immigration Act.59 
During the debate on moral turpitude deportations, Representative 
Sabath of Illinois explained that his goal was to protect the alien who 
commits a crime labeled as a crime involving moral turpitude 
without knowing, prior to carrying out the crime, that the crime was 
a crime involving moral turpitude.60 Furthermore, Congressman 
Mann asserted that the issue of deportation for petty crimes 
involving moral turpitude was resolved by a provision in the 1917 
Immigration Act that forbade deportation if the sentencing judge did 
not agree with the deportation.61 Although that provision was 
repealed in 1990, the goal of repealing the provision was to increase 
the power of the federal government in deciding immigration 
consequences of criminal behavior.62 Repealing the provision did not 
prohibit a fact-based inquiry for identifying crimes involving moral 
turpitude.63 Despite hints of a fact-based procedure for identifying a 
crime involving moral turpitude, Congress never codified this 
procedure in the 1917 Immigration Act.64 Furthermore, Congress 
never codified the fact-based procedure, nor denied the fact-based 
procedure, in subsequent amendments to immigration law.65 
                                                 
 56. Id. 
 57. Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084, 1084.  
 58. Simon-Kerr, supra note 28, at 1047.  
 59. See id. at 1048. 
 60. 53 CONG. REC. 5167 (1916) (statement of Rep. Adolph Sabath).  
 61. 53 CONG. REC. 5169 (1916) (statement of Rep. James Mann).  
 62. Andrew Moore, Criminal Deportation, Post-Conviction Relief and the 
Lost Cause of Uniformity, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 665, 675-76 (2008) (asserting that 
in repealing the Judicial Recommendation Against Deportation (JRAD), “Congress 
wanted the power of deciding the immigration consequences of criminal behavior to 
rest exclusively with the federal authorities”). 
 63. See id. 
 64. See Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874; see also Simon-Kerr, 
supra note 28, at 1058.  
 65. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 693 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2008), 
vacated, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2015) (“[The INA is] silent on the 
precise method that immigration judges and courts should use to determine if a prior 
conviction is for a crime involving moral turpitude.”).  
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The current version of the INA leaves many questions about 
the procedure for identifying a crime involving moral turpitude.66 
Much like the 1917 Immigration Act, the current version of the INA 
does not explicitly identify the procedure for identifying a crime 
involving moral turpitude.67 Furthermore, the INA, like previous 
immigration legislation, does not define the term “moral turpitude.”68 
Nevertheless, the statute does define “conviction,”69 which is a word 
used in the moral-turpitude-inadmissibility provision.70 Ultimately, 
Congress leaves little guidance in the INA for articulating the 
procedure for identifying a crime involving moral turpitude.71 
The legislative history of the INA and the current version of the 
INA do not explicitly articulate the procedure for identifying a crime 
involving moral turpitude.72 Furthermore, given the legislative 
history of previous versions of the INA and the definitions within the 
current version of the INA, the implicit intent of Congress is not 
clear.73 Without classifying the procedure for identifying a crime 
involving moral turpitude, Congress delegated the task of enforcing 
inadmissibility for a crime involving moral turpitude to regulatory 
agencies; these regulatory agencies are subject to limited judicial 
review.74  
                                                 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Simon-Kerr, supra note 28, at 1046 (“As Congress continued to reenact 
the moral turpitude bar in immigration statutes over the course of the twentieth 
century, it continued to leave the term undefined, delegating the responsibility for 
fathoming moral turpitude’s meaning to immigration officials and the federal 
courts.”). Since a crime involving moral turpitude (1) is defined by immigration 
officials and federal courts; and (2) refers to moral standards, “its definition 
necessarily changes over time and from place to place.” Harms, supra note 4, at 265. 
 69. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(48)(A) (2012). The statute reads: 
(48)(A) The term “conviction” means, with respect to an alien, a formal 
judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of 
guilt has been withheld, where – 
(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a 
plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to 
warrant a finding of guilt, and  
(ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or 
restraint on the alien’s liberty to be imposed.  
Id.  
 70. Id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i). 
 71. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 693 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2008). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See Simon-Kerr, supra note 28, at 1044-69 (discussing the evolution of 
moral turpitude in immigration law). 
 74. See infra Section I.C. 
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C. Court Review of Agency Interpretations 
Since the Attorney General is responsible for making 
determinations on questions of immigration law under the INA,75 a 
responsibility that the Attorney General may delegate to the BIA,76 
the judicial branch plays a limited role in reviewing the Attorney 
General’s and the BIA’s conclusions on questions of immigration 
law.77 If the INA is ambiguous with respect to a particular 
immigration-law issue, then the role of the judiciary is limited to 
determining whether the Attorney General’s or the BIA’s 
interpretation of the INA is reasonable.78 In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court 
established a two-part test for making this reasonable-interpretation 
determination.79 First, a court must determine whether Congress has 
directly spoken on the precise issue.80 If Congress has directly 
spoken on the precise issue, then the court must defer to the intent of 
Congress.81 If Congress has not directly spoken on the precise issue, 
or if it is ambiguous whether Congress has directly spoken on the 
precise issue, then the court must continue the analysis onto the 
second step.82 In the second step, the court must determine whether 
the agency’s interpretation is based on a permissible construction of 
the statute.83 A permissible construction is present when the 
interpretation is reasonable and not “arbitrary and capricious.”84 
                                                 
 75. § 1103(a)(1). 
 76. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1) (2015).  
 77. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842-43 (1984) (stipulating that judicial review is limited “[w]hen a court reviews an 
agency’s construction of the statute which it administers”); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 
787, 792 (1977) (“At the outset, it is important to underscore the limited scope of 
judicial inquiry into immigration legislation. This Court has repeatedly emphasized 
that ‘over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete 
than it is over’ the admission of aliens.” (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. 
Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909))).  
 78. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. The agency’s construction of a statute 
need not be the best construction. Id. at 844-45. 
 79. Id. at 842-43.  
 80. Id. at 842.  
 81. Id. at 842-43 (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the 
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress.”). 
 82. Id. at 843.  
 83. Id.  
 84. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 42-43 (1983) (accepting that “arbitrary and capricious” means that the rule 
“is rational, based on consideration of the relevant factors, and within the scope of 
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Furthermore, if the statute is ambiguous on a particular issue and the 
agency has not spoken to the issue, then federal circuit courts may 
impose their own interpretations of that issue.85 However, once the 
agency renders an interpretation of the issue, federal circuit courts 
must rescind their interpretation and accept the agency’s reasonable 
construction of the statute.86 
In determining ambiguity within a statute, courts typically use a 
variety of traditional canons of construction.87 Traditional canons of 
construction generally fall into one of two categories:88 textual 
canons89 and substantive canons.90 Examples of textual canons 
                                                                                                       
the authority delegated to the agency by the statute”). A rule is “arbitrary and 
capricious if the agency” (1) “has relied on factors which Congress has not intended 
it to consider”; (2) “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem”; 
(3) “offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before 
the agency”; or (4) “is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in 
view or the product of agency expertise.” Id. at 43.  
 85. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 
967, 983 (2005). 
 86. Id. at 983-84. The Court rejected the argument that an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute is invalid if it is inconsistent with the agency’s past 
practice. Id. at 981. The Court stated: 
Unexplained inconsistency is, at most, a reason for holding an 
interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency 
practice . . . . [I]f the agency adequately explains the reasons for a 
reversal of policy, “change is not invalidating, since the whole point of 
Chevron is to leave the discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute 
with the implementing agency.” 
Id. (quoting Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996)). 
 87. James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the 
Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005) (“The phrase 
‘canons of construction’ is understood to encompass a set of background norms and 
conventions that are used by courts when interpreting statutes.”).  
 88. Id. at 12. 
 89. Id. 
[Textual] canons consist of predictive guidelines as to what the 
legislature likely meant based on its choice of certain words rather than 
others, or its grammatical configuration of those words in a given 
sentence, or the relationship between those words and text found in other 
parts of the same statute or in similar statutes. These canons do not 
purport to convey a judge’s own policy preferences, but rather to give 
effect to “ordinary” or “common” meaning of the language enacted by 
the legislature, which in turn is understood to promote the actual or 
constructive intent of the legislature that enacted such language.  
Id.  
 90. Id. at 13. Substantive canons “are not predicated on . . . what a rational 
Congress presumptively must have meant . . . . Rather, substantive canons reflect 
judicially-based concerns, grounded in the courts’ understanding of how to treat 
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include noscitur a sociis, which dictates that “words grouped in a list 
should be given related meaning,”91 and inclusio unius est exclusio 
alterius, which specifies that “to include one item is to exclude other 
similar items.”92 In terms of substantive canons, the constitutional 
avoidance doctrine prompts the court to refrain from interpreting a 
statute in a way that would render the statute unconstitutional.93 Next, 
congressional silence is usually presumed to be a weak indicator of 
congressional intent.94 Traditional canons of construction95 aid in 
resolving ambiguity in statutes.96 In turn, the resolution of ambiguity 
in statutes influences whether an agency’s statutory interpretation, 
such as the Attorney General’s or the BIA’s interpretation of the 
procedure for identifying a crime involving moral turpitude, will be 
upheld under the limited judicial review.97 
The federal government has a plenary power in immigration 
law, which includes the plenary power to identify the procedure for 
identifying a crime involving moral turpitude.98 The plenary power to 
identify this procedure was delegated to the Attorney General under 
the INA.99 In turn, the Attorney General delegated the plenary power 
                                                                                                       
statutory text with reference to judicially perceived constitutional priorities, pre-
enactment common law practices, or specific statutory based policies.” Id.  
 91. Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 36 (1990) (quoting 
Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 114-15 (1989)).  
 92. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 648 (2010). 
 93. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001). 
 94. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 67, 98-99 (1988). Due to the structure of Congress, inaction on a 
particular issue of law is far more likely than action on that particular issue of law. 
Id. at 98. The agenda of Congress is limited, and “to gain a place on that agenda, a 
measure must not only have substantial support, but be considered urgent by key 
people.” Id. at 99. Furthermore, even if an issue gains a place on the legislative 
agenda, “it is usually doomed if there is substantial opposition, whether or not most 
legislators favor it, because of the variety of procedural roadblocks opponents may 
erect.” Id.  
 95. The discussion of traditional canons of construction in this Note does 
not encompass all traditional canons of construction; there are additional traditional 
canons of construction that are likely irrelevant to the context of this Note. See, e.g., 
David M. Blurton, Canons of Construction, Stare Decisis and Dependent Indian 
Communities: A Test of Judicial Integrity, 16 ALASKA L. REV. 37, 41 (1999) 
(discussing federal Indian-law canons of construction); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 332 (2000) (discussing the rule of 
lenity). 
 96. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 87, at 7.  
 97. See id. at 112 (“[T]he canons are . . . one of many interpretive tools 
available to judges . . . .”). 
 98. See supra Section I.A. 
 99. See supra Section I.B. 
230 Michigan State Law Review  2016 
to determine this procedure to the BIA.100 The Attorney General and 
the BIA are subject to limited judicial review.101 These three 
factors—the plenary power of the federal government, the INA, and 
judicial deference to agency action—greatly influence courts in 
determining the proper procedure for identifying a crime involving 
moral turpitude.102 All three factors influenced (1) the varying 
procedures for identifying a crime involving moral turpitude before 
Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino decision; (2) Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino 
decision; and (3) the varying procedures for identifying a crime 
involving moral turpitude after Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino decision.103 
II. MUKASEY’S SILVA-TREVINO DECISION: BEFORE, DURING, AND 
AFTER 
Prior to Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino decision, federal circuit 
courts relied on circuit precedent to select the procedure for 
identifying a crime involving moral turpitude.104 In Mukasey’s Silva-
Trevino decision, Mukasey created a three-part procedure for 
identifying a crime involving moral turpitude.105 Although this 
procedure was intended to resolve the inconsistencies among federal 
circuit courts in identifying a crime involving moral turpitude, the 
result was quite the opposite.106 Some federal circuit courts 
completely rejected Mukasey’s procedure, some federal circuit 
courts completely accepted Mukasey’s procedure, and some federal 
circuit courts adopted parts of Mukasey’s procedure.107 The 
continued disparity between federal circuit courts ultimately 
influenced Holder’s vacatur of Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino decision.108 
A. The Varying Standards Before Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino Decision 
Before Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino decision, federal circuit courts 
used a variety of procedures for identifying a crime involving moral 
                                                 
 100. See Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550, 553 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2015). 
 101. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842-43 (1984).  
 102. See infra Part II. 
 103. See infra Part II. 
 104. See infra Section II.A. 
 105. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 704 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2008), 
vacated, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550. 
 106. See infra Section II.C. 
 107. See infra Section II.C. 
 108. Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 553. 
 Embracing Silva-Trevino 231 
turpitude.109 Prior to that decision, neither the Attorney General nor 
the BIA issued a uniform procedure for identifying a crime involving 
moral turpitude, leaving the federal circuit courts with great 
discretion on the issue.110 The three categories of procedures used by 
federal circuit courts in identifying a crime involving moral turpitude 
before Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino decision were the (1) categorical 
approach; (2) modified-categorical approach; and (3) fact-based 
approach.111  
1. The Categorical Approach  
The most widely applied procedure for identifying a crime 
involving moral turpitude prior to Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino decision 
was the categorical approach.112 The categorical approach prompts 
adjudicators to exclude underlying circumstances giving rise to a 
criminal conviction and to determine whether the crime, as defined 
by statute, “necessarily” involves moral turpitude.113 That is, if all 
convictions under the criminal statute are crimes involving moral 
turpitude, then the alien’s conviction under the criminal statute is 
also a crime involving moral turpitude.114 In applying the categorical 
approach in the immigration-law context, courts rely on Taylor v. 
United States115 and Shepard v. United States.116 In both cases, the 
Supreme Court rejected an inquiry into extrinsic evidence in the 
context of recidivist enhancements in criminal proceedings.117 Even 
                                                 
 109. See infra Subsections II.A.1-3. 
 110. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 688. 
 111. See infra Subsections II.A.1-3. 
 112. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 693-94. The categorical approach, 
in the immigration context, was established in United States v. Uhl, 203 F. 152, 154 
(S.D.N.Y. 1913), aff’d, 210 F. 860 (2d Cir. 1914). In Uhl, the Court examined the 
question of whether a conviction for criminal libel constituted a crime involving 
moral turpitude for inadmissibility. Id. at 153. In determining that criminal libel was 
not a crime involving moral turpitude, the judge declared “the offense of criminal 
libel does not in its inherent nature involve moral turpitude and that in classifying it 
under the immigration laws, it must be designed as one which does not possess that 
element.” Id. at 155.  
 113. Rebecca Sharpless, Toward a True Elements Test: Taylor and the 
Categorical Analysis of Crimes in Immigration Law, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979, 993-
94 (2008).  
 114. Id. 
 115. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). 
 116. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005). 
 117. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 25-26; Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602.  
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though most federal circuit courts agreed on using the categorical 
approach, they used different tests within the categorical approach.118 
Federal circuit courts utilizing the categorical approach used 
one of three tests in determining whether an alien’s crime under the 
statute “necessarily” involved moral turpitude: the “least culpable 
conduct test,” the “realistic probability test,” or the “common case 
test.”119 The “least culpable conduct test,” adopted by the Second 
Circuit,120 Third Circuit,121 and Fifth Circuit,122 examined whether the 
minimum conduct necessary to sustain a conviction under the statute 
involved moral turpitude.123 The “realistic probability test,”124 used by 
the Ninth Circuit,125 focused on whether there was a “realistic 
probability” that the criminal statute applied to conduct that does not 
involve moral turpitude.126 Lastly, the “common case test,” utilized 
by the First Circuit,127 inquired whether the crime would be one of 
                                                 
 118. Sharpless, supra note 113, at 995-96 (“The BIA and federal courts have 
applied some form of a categorical approach . . . .”(emphasis added)).  
 119. See Dadhania, supra note 29, at 326 & n.66. 
 120. Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 2001) (asserting that, in 
applying the categorical approach, “any conduct falling within the purview of the 
statute must by its nature entail moral turpitude”). 
 121. Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 92 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that under 
the categorical approach, “the elements of the underlying offense must necessarily 
establish that all convictions involve moral turpitude”). 
 122. Amouzadeh v. Winfrey, 467 F.3d 451, 455 (5th Cir. 2006) (reasoning 
that a crime involving moral turpitude is found when “the minimum reading of the 
statute necessarily reaches only offenses involving moral turpitude”). 
 123. See, e.g., id. at 455; Knapik, 384 F.3d at 92; Dalton, 257 F.3d at 204. 
 124. The Supreme Court established the “realistic probability test” in 
Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007). In Gonzales, the federal 
government claimed that the alien was deportable because the alien was convicted of 
a theft for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(G) (2006). Id. at 183. The Court, applying the categorical approach, 
asserted that in order to demonstrate that “a state statute creates a crime outside the 
generic definition of a listed crime in a federal statute,” one must demonstrate “a 
realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its 
statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime.” Id. at 193.  
 125. Nicanor-Romero v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 992, 1007 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(“[W]e conclude that there is a ‘realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility,’ 
that [the] misdemeanor conviction . . . does not rise to the level of a ‘crime involving 
moral turpitude.’”). Despite the overturn of Nicanor-Romero, the case demonstrates 
an approach, prior to Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino decision, of the federal circuit courts 
in applying the categorical approach. See id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Pino v. Nicolls, 215 F.2d 237, 245 (1st Cir. 1954) (“If the crime in its 
general nature is one which in common usage would be classified as a crime 
involving moral turpitude, neither the administrative officials . . . nor the courts on 
review of administrative action are under the oppressive burden of taking and 
 Embracing Silva-Trevino 233 
moral turpitude in common usage.128 Thus, although most federal 
circuits agreed on using the categorical approach, the tests utilized 
within the categorical approach varied.129 In contrast to the 
categorical approach, federal circuit courts were less cohesive in 
utilizing the modified-categorical approach.130 
2. The Modified-Categorical Approach 
Prior to Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino decision, federal circuit 
courts disagreed on when, if ever, to utilize the modified-categorical 
approach.131 Under the modified-categorical approach, the 
adjudicator examines the alien’s record of conviction to determine 
whether the alien’s specific conviction was for a crime involving 
moral turpitude.132 Even if federal circuit courts agreed on using the 
modified-categorical approach, those federal circuit courts were split 
on (1) the circumstances giving rise to the application of the 
modified-categorical approach; and (2) what evidence could be 
examined within the “record of conviction.”133 
Federal circuit courts adopting the modified-categorical 
approach disagreed on when to apply the modified-categorical 
approach.134 Some federal circuit courts utilized the modified-
                                                                                                       
considering evidence of the circumstances.”), rev’d on other grounds, Pino v. 
Landon, 349 U.S. 901 (1955). 
 128. Id. There is a possibility that the Eighth Circuit implicitly utilized the 
“common usage test.” See Dadhania, supra note 29, at 318. In Marciano v. 
Immigration & Naturalization Service, the dissenting judge states that the majority 
implicitly adopts the “common usage” test of Pino. Marciano v. Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv., 450 F.2d 1022, 1027-28 (8th Cir. 1971) (Eisele, J., dissenting). 
 129. See Sharpless, supra note 113, at 995-96.  
 130. See infra Subsection II.A.2. 
 131. See Sharpless, supra note 113, at 996-1000. Although the Second 
Circuit agreed with the Fifth Circuit in using the categorical approach, it rejected the 
Fifth Circuit’s use of the modified-categorical approach. Compare Dalton v. 
Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[I]f a statute encompasses both acts 
that do and do not involve moral turpitude, the BIA cannot sustain a deportability 
finding . . . .” (quoting Michel v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 206 F.3d 253, 
263 (2d Cir. 2000))), with Amouzadeh v. Winfrey, 467 F.3d 451, 455 (5th Cir. 
2006) (acknowledging that “[i]f a statute is divisible, [the adjudicator looks] at the 
alien’s record of conviction to determine whether he has been convicted of a 
subsection that qualifies as a [crime involving moral turpitude]” (quoting Smalley v. 
Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 332, 336 (5th Cir. 2003))). 
 132. Sharpless, supra note 113, at 996.  
 133. Id. at 996-1000. 
 134. Id. at 996. 
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categorical approach only when the statute was “divisible.”135 That is, 
if only some offenses under the statute were crimes involving moral 
turpitude, then the adjudicator would look to the record of conviction 
to determine if the alien was convicted for an offense that was a 
crime involving moral turpitude.136 Other federal circuit courts 
utilized the modified-categorical approach regardless of whether the 
statute was “divisible” in order to ascertain the nature of the 
conviction.137 In essence, there was no uniformity among the federal 
circuits with respect to the utilization of the modified-categorical 
approach.138 
Federal circuit courts also disagreed on the standard regarding 
the set of documents that could be considered in the modified-
categorical approach.139 For example, the Second Circuit’s standard 
considered, among other things, “the charging document, a plea 
agreement, a verdict or judgment of conviction, a record of the 
sentence, or a plea colloquy transcript.”140 In contrast, the Third 
Circuit’s standard examined “the record of conviction, which 
includes the indictment, verdict, and sentence.”141 Next, the Ninth 
Circuit was the only federal circuit court to explicitly state that 
“charging papers alone are never sufficient.”142 Just as federal circuit 
courts disagreed on (1) whether to use the modified-categorical 
approach; and (2) the standard for the modified-categorical approach, 
they also disagreed on (1) whether to use the fact-based approach; 
and (2) the standard for the fact-based approach.143  
3. The Fact-Based Approach 
A minority of federal circuits approved of using facts beyond 
the conviction record in determining whether the alien committed a 
                                                 
 135. Id.  
 136. Id. at 997.  
 137. Id. at 999 (“[F]ederal courts appear to sanction recourse to the record of 
conviction even when a statute is nondivisible.”).  
 138. See id. at 996-1000. 
 139. Id. at 996.  
 140. Wala v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 102, 108 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Dickson v. 
Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 44, 53 (2d Cir. 2003)).  
 141. Daibo v. Att’y Gen., 265 F. App’x 56, 59 (3d Cir. 2008).  
 142. Lara-Chacon v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 
United States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201, 1211 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 143. See infra Subsection II.A.3. 
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crime involving moral turpitude.144 For example, the Third Circuit, 
unable to conclude that a crime was a crime involving moral 
turpitude due to a discrepancy between an indictment and a plea 
colloquy, vacated a final order of removal and granted a petition for 
review.145 Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit explicitly permitted the 
use of evidence beyond both the charging records and the record of 
conviction.146 Thus, the precedent of the Third Circuit and the 
Seventh Circuit demonstrates that some federal circuit courts went 
beyond the modified-categorical approach by using facts outside of 
the conviction record.147  
The categorical approach, the modified-categorical approach, 
and the fact-based approach composed the various procedures for 
identifying a crime involving moral turpitude prior to Mukasey’s 
Silva-Trevino decision.148 The varying procedures of federal circuit 
courts in identifying a crime involving moral turpitude prompted 
Mukasey to create a uniform approach.149 This uniform approach is 
articulated in Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino decision.150  
                                                 
 144. See, e.g., Ali v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737, 743 (7th Cir. 2008); Valansi v. 
Ashcroft, 278 F.3d 203, 214, 217-18 (3d Cir. 2002).  
 145. Valansi, 278 F.3d at 217-18. In granting a petition for review, the Third 
Circuit implicitly granted an opportunity to investigate facts beyond the conviction 
record. See id.  
 146. Ali, 521 F.3d at 743. The court reasoned: 
Instead of starting with the procedures used in criminal prosecutions, we 
think it best to recognize that there are at least two distinct questions in 
immigration proceedings. The first is the fact of the prior conviction, 
which usually is the only thing that needs to be established for recidivist 
sentencing in a criminal prosecution. The second is the appropriate 
classification of that conviction, which may require additional 
information. . . . [S]ince the charging papers . . . are not framed with such 
classifications in mind (for “moral turpitude” just isn’t relevant to the 
criminal prosecution; it is not as if “turpitude” were an element of an 
offense). 
Id. at 741-42.  
 147. See id.; Valansi, 278 F.3d at 217-18. 
 148. See Sharpless, supra note 113, at 979-1035 (describing the various 
approaches of the federal circuit courts in terms of the procedure for identifying a 
crime involving moral turpitude).  
 149. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 694-95 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2008), 
vacated, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2015). 
 150. Id. at 699. 
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B. An Attempt at Justice and Unity: Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino 
Decision 
Noticing the varying procedures of federal circuit courts for 
identifying a crime involving moral turpitude, Mukasey created a 
uniform procedure for identifying a crime involving moral 
turpitude.151 To formulate the uniform procedure as binding 
precedent, Mukasey certified the Silva-Trevino decision for review 
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1.152 Furthermore, he cited 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1103(a)(1) as statutory authority for establishing the procedure.153  
Mukasey’s three-part procedure for identifying a crime 
involving moral turpitude blended the pre-existing procedures of 
federal circuit courts in identifying these crimes and permitted the 
use of extrinsic evidence during the adjudication process.154 The first 
part of Mukasey’s procedure involves a categorical approach using 
the “realistic probability” standard.155 Under this standard, an alien 
commits a crime involving moral turpitude if the crimes that are 
realistically prosecuted under the statute of conviction are always 
crimes involving moral turpitude.156 The second part utilizes a 
modified-categorical approach, which limits the immigration judge’s 
examination of the conviction record to “documents such as the 
indictment, the judgment of conviction, jury instructions, a signed 
guilty plea, and the plea transcript.”157 The last part specifies that if 
the record of conviction is inconclusive, then “judges may, to the 
                                                 
 151. Id. at 694-95 (highlighting that due to the varying approaches of the 
federal circuit courts in adjudicating alleged crimes involving moral turpitude, “[a]n 
alien who resides in one circuit might be eligible for adjustment of status even 
though he committed the same crime as an alien who lives in a different circuit and 
is ineligible for such relief”).  
 152. Silva-Trevino v. Holder, 742 F.3d 197, 198 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2014)).  
 153. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 688-89 (asserting that the INA gives 
the Attorney General the authority to craft an approach for identifying a crime 
involving moral turpitude (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2006))).  
 154. See id. at 704.  
 155. Id. at 689-90, 704. 
 156. Id. at 689-90. 
[I]n evaluating whether an alien’s prior offense is one that categorically 
involves moral turpitude, immigration judges must determine whether 
there is a “realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility,” that the State 
or Federal criminal statute pursuant to which the alien was convicted 
would be applied to reach conduct that does not involve moral turpitude. 
Id. (quoting Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)).  
 157. Id. at 690. 
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extent they deem it necessary and appropriate, consider evidence 
beyond the formal record of conviction.”158 Nevertheless, the 
consideration of evidence beyond the formal record of conviction is 
constrained by the factual findings and determinations of earlier 
proceedings.159 Thus, although Mukasey’s procedure permitted a 
more factual analysis for identifying a crime involving moral 
turpitude, it did not necessarily involve elements that were 
completely foreign to federal circuit courts.160 
Mukasey provided extensive reasoning for his three-part 
procedure for identifying a crime involving moral turpitude.161 First, 
recognizing the paramount consequences of deportation162 and the 
lack of uniformity among federal circuit courts in identifying crimes 
involving moral turpitude,163 Mukasey asserted a need for a uniform 
                                                 
 158. Id.  
 159. Id. (“The goal of this inquiry is to discern the nature of the underlying 
conviction where a mere examination of the statute itself does not yield the 
necessary information; it is not an occasion to relitigate facts or determinations made 
in the earlier criminal proceeding.”). 
 160. See, e.g., Ali v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737, 743 (7th Cir. 2008) (permitting 
the use of evidence beyond the record of conviction).  
 161. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 694-95. 
 162. Id. Deportation results in many severe consequences. Stephen H. 
Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of 
Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 513 (2007). Legomsky 
elaborates: 
[Deportation consequences] include not only all the obvious traumas 
associated with forcible separation from family, friends, and community, 
loss of property, and loss of a livelihood, but also a bar on returning for at 
least ten years and sometimes forever; the loss of social security benefits 
for which the deportee has paid and on which he or she might depend; and 
the emotional and financial losses for U.S. citizens and other family 
members who are left behind. 
Id. Furthermore, aliens are unlikely to effectively defend themselves from 
deportation because aliens are not entitled to legal representation in immigration 
proceedings, which forces the aliens to “proceed alone through a truncated and 
severe removal process with its tight deadlines, limited defenses, and countless traps 
for the unwary.” Margaret H. Taylor & Ronald F. Wright, The Sentencing Judge as 
Immigration Judge, 51 EMORY L.J. 1131, 1141 (2002). 
 163. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 693-94. First, Mukasey pointed to the 
different tests of the federal circuit courts within the categorical approach, which 
included the “least culpable conduct” test, the “realistic probability” test, and the 
“common usage” test. Id. Mukasey also drew attention to the variety of approaches 
utilized after the application of the categorical approach; some federal circuit courts 
applied a modified-categorical approach that limited inquiry into the record of 
conviction while other federal circuit courts permitted the use of all relevant 
evidence. Id. at 694.  
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procedure.164 Next, Mukasey argued that many of the procedures of 
federal circuit courts were poorly designed to distinguish between an 
offense that is a crime involving moral turpitude and an offense that 
is not a crime involving moral turpitude.165 That is, some procedures 
were likely an over-inclusive application of inadmissibility for a 
crime involving moral turpitude while other approaches were likely 
an under-inclusive application of inadmissibility for a crime 
involving moral turpitude.166 Over-inclusive applications resulted in 
the deportation of aliens who did not commit crimes involving moral 
turpitude.167 On the other hand, under-inclusive applications resulted 
in aliens avoiding deportation despite the fact that those aliens 
committed crimes involving moral turpitude.168 Furthermore, 
Mukasey reasoned that restricting the moral turpitude analysis to 
either the statute or the record of conviction is not compelled by the 
INA.169 Rather, Mukasey argued, the INA invites an analysis of 
extrinsic evidence because the moral-turpitude-inadmissibility 
provision explicitly states that “any alien convicted of, or who admits 
having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute 
the essential elements of a crime involving moral turpitude” is 
                                                 
 164. Id. (“[B]ecause our immigration laws ‘often affect individuals in the 
most fundamental ways,’ those laws ‘to the greatest extent possible . . . should be 
applied in a uniform manner nationwide.” (quoting Cerna, 20 I. & N. Dec. 399, 408 
(B.I.A. 1991))). The Supreme Court endorses uniformity in the application of 
federal law. See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 
1580-81 n.34 (2008) (addressing the Supreme Court’s policy of resolving circuit 
splits and discussing Supreme Court decisions promoting uniformity in the 
application of federal law). Uniformity in immigration law is particularly important 
because it may “serve systematic and expressive interests by conveying a unified 
sense of how the United States will interact with the people of the world. . . . [It] 
also provides a foundation for the protection of immigrants’ rights by advancing a 
clear conception of how the country conceptualizes the value of immigration . . . .” 
Cristina M. Rodríguez, Uniformity and Integrity in Immigration Law: Lessons from 
the Decisions of Justice (and Judge) Sotomayor, 123 YALE L.J.F. 499, 501 (2014).  
 165. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 695. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. As an example, Mukasey pointed to the “common case” test. Id. In 
the “common case” test, over-inclusion would result from the immigration judge 
applying the moral turpitude provisions to aliens whose crimes did not in fact 
involve moral turpitude. Id. 
 168. Id. As an example, Mukasey pointed to the “minimum conduct” test. Id. 
“Such an analysis would require a judge to refrain from applying those provisions 
with respect to criminal offenses that do involve moral turpitude if the judge simply 
hypothesizes some theoretical situation in which the statute might be applied to 
conduct that does not involve moral turpitude.” Id. 
 169. Id. at 699-700.  
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inadmissible.170 Lastly, Mukasey asserted that the word “involving” 
in “a crime involving moral turpitude” demonstrates that “involving 
moral turpitude” modifies “crime.”171 In addition to providing his 
underlying reasoning, Mukasey addressed potential counter-
arguments in the opinion.172 
Mukasey attacked the reasoning that the various federal circuit 
courts used to support their respective moral turpitude procedures.173 
First, Mukasey downplayed the application of Taylor and Shepard, 
Supreme Court cases rejecting an inquiry into extrinsic evidence in 
the context of recidivist enhancements in criminal proceedings, to 
immigration proceedings.174 Mukasey reasoned that those cases 
revolved around the application of the Sixth Amendment to criminal 
proceedings.175 Since immigration law is civil, not criminal, the Sixth 
Amendment does not apply.176 Furthermore, Mukasey attacked the 
reasoning of the courts concerning an increased administrative 
burden arising from a factual inquiry by asserting, “how much time 
the agency wants to devote to the resolution of particular issues is . . . 
a question for the agency itself rather than the judiciary.”177 Despite 
Mukasey’s efforts of qualifying his three-part procedure and 
addressing the possible counter-arguments to that procedure, federal 
                                                 
 170. Id. at 699 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2006)).  
 171. Id. at 693. If “involving moral turpitude” modifies “crime,” then this 
would invite a factual inquiry into each alleged crime involving moral turpitude to 
determine whether the crime did in fact consist of moral depravity. See id. 
 172. Id. at 700-02.  
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 702. 
 175. Id. at 701. In criminal proceedings, the defense council has a duty to 
inform the client of potential deportation consequences of pleading guilty to the 
alleged crime. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373-74 (2009). Additionally, the 
prosecutor has an advantage in plea negotiations because “the criminal prosecutor is 
the one who has the discretion to determine the type and severity of the criminal 
charge that triggers the removal.” Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 
NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1351 (2010) (elaborating on the significant advantage of the 
prosecution in criminal proceedings implicating removal).  
 176. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 701. Mukasey also mentioned that 
limiting the inquiry in criminal convictions makes sense because an inquiry into the 
record will usually result in an answer; however, in the case of moral turpitude, the 
“charging papers that led to the prior conviction are not framed” for immigration 
purposes. Id. (quoting Ali v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737, 741-42 (7th Cir. 2008)).  
 177. Id. (quoting Ali, 521 F.3d at 741). Mukasey acknowledged that 
“administrative efficiency is undeniably important, [but] it is ‘secondary to the 
determination and enforcement of’ statutory language and ‘obvious legislative 
intent.’” Id. at 702 (quoting Marciano v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 450 
F.2d 1022, 1029 (8th Cir. 1971) (Eisele, J., dissenting)). 
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circuit courts were hesitant to accept the procedure, resulting in 
Holder’s vacatur of Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino decision.178 
C. The Varying Standards After Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino Decision 
and Holder’s Vacatur 
The reactions of federal circuit courts to Mukasey’s three-part 
procedure for identifying a crime involving moral turpitude were 
swift.179 Contrary to the intentions of Mukasey in issuing Silva-
Trevino, the decision resulted in even greater disparity between 
federal circuit courts in terms of the procedure for identifying a 
crime involving moral turpitude.180 Some federal circuit courts 
completely resisted Mukasey’s procedure, while others either 
partially or completely accepted the procedure.181 This disparity 
among federal circuit courts prompted Holder to vacate Mukasey’s 
Silva-Trevino decision.182 
1. Federal Circuit Courts Rejecting Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino 
Decision  
The Third Circuit, Fourth Circuit, Fifth Circuit, and Eleventh 
Circuit rejected Mukasey’s three-part procedure for identifying a 
crime involving moral turpitude.183 The reasoning for rejecting the 
                                                 
 178. See infra Section II.C. 
 179. See Dadhania, supra note 29, at 340-46. 
 180. See infra Subsections II.C.1-2.  
 181. See infra Subsections II.C.1-2. 
 182. See infra Subsection II.C.3. 
 183. The Third Circuit currently uses the “least culpable conduct” test for 
both the categorical approach and the modified-categorical approach. Jean-Louis v. 
Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 466 (3d Cir. 2009) (specifying that when a statute of 
conviction contains elements “sufficient for conviction of the federal offense and 
others of which are not,” the court “examin[es] the record of conviction for the 
narrow purpose of determining the specific subpart under which the defendant was 
convicted”). The Fourth Circuit also applies the “least culpable conduct” test in the 
categorical approach and permits the use of a modified-categorical approach; 
however, the Fourth Circuit limits the examination of the record of conviction to 
“the charging document, the plea agreement, the plea colloquy, and any explicit 
findings of fact made by the trial judge.” Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 485 
(4th Cir. 2012). The Fifth Circuit utilizes the “least culpable conduct” test and looks 
to the alien’s record of conviction “in the case of divisible statutes.” Silva-Trevino v. 
Holder, 742 F.3d 197, 200 (5th Cir. 2014). Lastly, the Eleventh Circuit is not 
explicit as to which categorical approach it utilizes; nevertheless, within the 
modified-categorical approach, it limits inquiry to “the charging document, plea, 
verdict, and sentence.” Fajardo v. Att’y Gen., 659 F.3d 1303, 1305 (11th Cir. 2011). 
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procedure mainly encompassed textual arguments.184 Additionally, 
some federal circuit courts discussed practical concerns with 
Mukasey’s procedure.185 
The textual concerns for rejecting Mukasey’s three-part 
procedure focused on provisions within the INA.186 The Third Circuit 
pointed to the fact that the INA defines “conviction” as a “formal 
judgment of guilt”187 and, under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(B),188 “limits 
the inquiry to the record of conviction or comparable judicial record 
evidence.”189 While the Fifth Circuit also relied on the definition of 
“conviction” and 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(B), it analyzed the section 
further by claiming that in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(B) there “is no 
mention of any additional evidence, and the introductory phrasing, 
‘any of the following documents or records,’ gives no indication that 
extrinsic evidence is contemplated.”190 Further, to counter the 
assertion that the word “involving” in “a crime involving moral 
                                                 
 184. See, e.g., Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 480. 
 185. See, e.g., Silva-Trevino, 742 F.3d at 202.  
 186. See, e.g., Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 480. 
 187. For a complete definition of “conviction” under the INA, see supra note 
69. 
 188. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(B) reads: 
(B) Proof of convictions  
In any proceeding under this chapter, any of the following documents or 
records (or a certified copy of such an official document or record) shall 
constitute proof of a criminal conviction:  
(i) An official record of judgment and conviction.  
(ii) An official record of plea, verdict, and sentence. 
(iii) A docket entry from court records that indicates the existence of 
the conviction. 
(iv) Official minutes of a court proceeding or a transcript of a court 
hearing in which the court takes notice of the existence of the 
conviction. 
(v) An abstract of a record of conviction prepared by the court in 
which the conviction was entered . . . that indicates the charge or 
section of law violated, the disposition of the case, the existence and 
date of conviction, and the sentence. 
(vi) Any document or record prepared by, or under the direction of, the 
court in which the conviction was entered that indicates the existence 
of a conviction. 
(vii) Any document or record attesting to the conviction that is 
maintained by an official of a State or Federal penal institution, which 
is the basis for that institution’s authority to assume custody of the 
individual named in the record. 
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(B) (2012). 
 189. Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 474, 480. 
 190. Silva-Trevino, 742 F.3d at 201 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(B)). 
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turpitude” dictates an inquiry into the facts, the Third Circuit and the 
Fourth Circuit cited to Jordan v. De George191 for the proposition 
that “crime involving moral turpitude” is a term of art; that is, 
“involving moral turpitude” does not modify “crime.”192 In addition, 
the Fourth Circuit believed that a plain reading of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) demonstrated that the section is split into two 
parts; one part addresses moral turpitude admissions while the other 
part addresses moral turpitude convictions.193 Utilizing this 
interpretation as a premise, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that 
Mukasey’s emphasis on “committing acts” appears only in the 
section addressing admissions.194 Next, the Fifth Circuit identified 
that Congress allows extrinsic evidence in other sections of the INA, 
including 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(7)(B), where the INA explicitly states 
that the immigration judge “shall consider any credible evidence.”195 
Thus, the Fifth Circuit reasoned, “[w]here Congress includes 
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another 
section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts 
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or 
exclusion.”196 Federal circuit courts were also concerned about the 
practicality of Mukasey’s procedure.197 
The practical concerns of federal circuit courts for rejecting 
Mukasey’s three-part procedure focused on the intent of Congress 
and the negative externalities resulting from the application of 
Mukasey’s procedure.198 The Third Circuit mentioned that nothing in 
                                                 
 191. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 227 (1951). While the Court in De 
George did use the phrase “crime involving moral turpitude,” it also used “involving 
moral turpitude” to modify “crime.” Id. at 230 (“[O]ne question of the case was 
whether the crime of counterfeiting involved moral turpitude.”).  
 192. Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 481 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he 
participle ‘involving’ cannot be divorced from the unitary phrase ‘crime involving 
moral turpitude,’ which is a term of art . . . .”); Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 477 
(asserting that a crime involving moral turpitude “refers to a specific class of 
offenses, not to all conduct that happens to ‘involve’ moral depravity, because of an 
alien’s specific acts in a particular case”). 
 193. Prudencio, 669 F.3d at 481. For the exact text of the statutory provision, 
see supra note 51.  
 194. Prudencio, 669 F.3d at 481. 
 195. Silva-Trevino, 742 F.3d at 201 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(7)(B) 
(2012)). 
 196. Id. (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)). 
 197. See, e.g., id. at 202; Fajardo v. Att’y Gen., 659 F.3d 1303, 1309 (11th 
Cir. 2011); Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 476. 
 198. See, e.g., Silva-Trevino, 742 F.3d at 202; Fajardo, 659 F.3d at 1309; 
Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 476. 
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the legislative history of the INA suggested a fact-finding role for 
either the BIA or the federal circuit courts.199 In addition, the Fifth 
Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit asserted that if Congress embraced a 
fact-finding approach, then it would have amended the INA after the 
courts began excluding extrinsic evidence.200 The Third Circuit was 
also concerned about the consequences of conducting investigations 
beyond the conviction record and relied on Taylor as support for the 
proposition that such an investigation is prohibited.201 Lastly, the 
Fifth Circuit criticized Mukasey’s procedure as being counter-
productive to his stated purpose of unity; the court mainly relied on 
its opinion that there existed a general unity among federal circuit 
courts in prohibiting extrinsic evidence prior to Mukasey’s Silva-
Trevino decision.202 Despite the Third Circuit, Fourth Circuit, Fifth 
Circuit, and Eleventh Circuit completely rejecting Mukasey’s 
procedure, other circuit courts either partially or completely accepted 
Mukasey’s procedure.203 
2. Federal Circuit Courts Accepting Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino 
Decision 
After Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino decision, two federal circuit 
courts completely accepted Mukasey’s three-part procedure,204 and 
one federal circuit court partially accepted the procedure.205 Although 
                                                 
 199. Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 476. 
 200. Silva-Trevino, 742 F.3d at 202 (“[I]t seems that Congress would have 
given some indication if it wanted adjudicators to ‘abandon’ the longstanding 
categorical approach in favor of an ‘elaborate factfinding process.’” (quoting Taylor 
v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601 (1990))); Fajardo, 659 F.3d at 1309 (“[I]f 
Congress believed that the courts and the BIA had misinterpreted its intent, it could 
easily have amended the statute to allow adjudicators to consider the actual conduct 
underlying a conviction.”). 
 201. Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 476 (“[T]he practical evidentiary difficulties 
and potential unfairness associated with looking behind [an alien’s] offense of 
conviction [are] no less daunting in the immigration [context] than in the sentencing 
context.” (quoting Dulal-Whiteway v. United States, 501 F.3d 125, 126 (2d Cir. 
2007))). 
 202. Silva-Trevino, 742 F.3d at 205 (“[T]here was broad consensus among 
the federal courts [before Mukasey’s three-part test] that the ‘convicted of’ language 
precludes consideration of evidence beyond the conviction record . . . . [Thus], his 
interpretation has been counterproductive toward his own stated objective, [a 
uniform approach]”).  
 203. See infra Subsection II.C.2.  
 204. See Sanchez v. Holder, 757 F.3d 712, 720 (7th Cir. 2014); Bobadilla v. 
Holder, 679 F.3d 1052, 1059 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 205. See Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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the Seventh and the Eighth Circuits fully accepted Mukasey’s 
procedure, neither court was detailed in the reasoning for following 
the procedure.206 The Eighth Circuit pointed to the fact that an agency 
may alter its interpretation of the statute as long as that interpretation 
is permissible.207 Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that 
agency inconsistency is not a reason for declining a permissible 
interpretation of the statute.208 Additionally, despite not completely 
accepting Mukasey’s procedure, the Ninth Circuit currently uses the 
“realistic probability” categorical approach in identifying a crime 
involving moral turpitude.209 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit fails to 
provide reasoning on why it chose to accept only part of Mukasey’s 
three-part procedure.210 Thus, three federal circuit courts currently 
conform, at least partially, to Mukasey’s procedure for identifying a 
crime involving moral turpitude.211 
Despite Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino decision, disagreement 
remained among federal circuit courts on the proper procedure for 
identifying a crime involving moral turpitude.212 Some federal circuit 
courts rejected Mukasey’s procedure, while others either partially or 
completely accepted the procedure.213 This disagreement among the 
federal circuits influenced Holder in vacating Mukasey’s Silva-
Trevino decision. 
3. Holder’s Vacatur of Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino Decision 
Noting (1) continued disagreement between federal circuit 
courts with respect to the proper procedure for identifying a crime 
involving moral turpitude after Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino decision; 
and (2) recent Supreme Court decisions, Holder vacated Mukasey’s 
                                                 
 206. Sanchez, 757 F.3d at 720 (remanding the case due to the BIA not 
utilizing Mukasey’s three-prong procedure); Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1059 
(remanding the case and dictating an application of Mukasey’s three-prong 
procedure).  
 207. Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1057 (quoting Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & 
Research v. United States, 568 F.3d 675, 683 (8th Cir. 2009)). 
 208. Id. (quoting Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 
131 S. Ct. 704, 712 (2011)). 
 209. See Nunez, 594 F.3d at 1129. 
 210. See id.  
 211. See, e.g., Sanchez, 757 F.3d at 720; Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1059; Nunez, 
594 F.3d at 1129.  
 212. See Dadhania, supra note 29, at 340-46.  
 213. Id.  
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Silva-Trevino decision.214 Relying on the continued disagreement 
between federal circuit courts, Holder noted that Mukasey’s 
procedure “has not accomplished its stated goal of ‘establish[ing] a 
uniform framework for ensuring that the [INA’s] moral turpitude 
provisions are fairly and accurately applied.’”215 As additional 
support for vacating Mukasey’s decision, Holder cited Carachuri-
Rosendo v. Holder216 and Moncrieffe v. Holder,217 which are two 
recent Supreme Court decisions rejecting the use of the fact-based 
approach in determining whether a particular drug conviction 
constitutes an aggravated felony218 under the INA.219 According to 
Holder, these two Supreme Court decisions “cast doubt on the 
continued validity” of Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino decision.220 
Importantly, Holder noted that he did not disapprove of every aspect 
of Mukasey’s decision.221 Rather than articulating a procedure for 
identifying a crime involving moral turpitude, Holder charged the 
BIA with determining the procedure.222 Since Holder’s vacatur of 
Mukasey’s decision, the BIA issued only one opinion, unpublished, 
regarding the procedure for identifying a crime involving moral 
turpitude; furthermore, instead of articulating a clear procedure for 
identifying a crime involving moral turpitude in that opinion, the 
BIA merely applied the first step of every crime-involving-moral-
turpitude analysis: the categorical approach.223  
Continued disagreement between federal circuit courts, 
Holder’s vacatur of Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino decision, and the BIA’s 
silence result in uncertainty as to the procedure for identifying a 
                                                 
 214. Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550, 553 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2015). 
 215. Id. at 552 (quoting Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 688 (Op. Att’y 
Gen. 2008)). 
 216. Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 581-82 (2010) (holding 
that adjudicators cannot consider uncharged conduct when determining whether an 
alien is “convicted of” illicit trafficking, which is an aggravated felony under the 
INA).  
 217. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1690-92 (2013) (rejecting the 
use of a “circumstance-specific” analysis of a drug conviction for purposes of 
determining if the drug conviction constituted an aggravated felony).  
 218. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012), “[a]ny alien who is 
convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.”  
 219. Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 552-53.  
 220. Id. at 553.  
 221. Id.  
 222. Id.  
 223. In re Moses, No. A206 352 760, 2015 WL 4537073, at *2 (B.I.A. June 
10, 2015) (“To determine whether an offense constitutes a crime involving moral 
turpitude, we apply a categorical approach.”).  
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crime involving moral turpitude.224 The lack of a clear procedure for 
identifying crimes involving moral turpitude has great consequences 
for aliens facing the grave danger of inadmissibility or deportation.225 
The BIA’s adoption of Mukasey’s uniform procedure for identifying 
a crime involving moral turpitude would result in an equitable and 
reliable solution.226 
III. SIMPLIFYING THE LABYRINTH: A CASE FOR THE BIA’S 
ADOPTION OF MUKASEY’S SILVA-TREVINO DECISION 
Due to the various procedures among federal circuit courts for 
identifying a crime involving moral turpitude, two aliens who 
commit the same crime may be subject to two different standards of 
removal based solely on the jurisdiction in which they reside.227 As a 
result, one alien may face deportation even though he did not commit 
a crime involving moral turpitude, while another alien, who did 
commit a crime involving moral turpitude, may avoid deportation 
altogether.228 The BIA’s adoption of Mukasey’s three-part procedure 
for identifying a crime involving moral turpitude would (1) be 
consistent with traditional agency deference;229 (2) demystify the 
procedure for identifying crimes of moral turpitude through the 
creation of a universal approach;230 and (3) avoid manipulations 
within the criminal system with respect to conviction records.231 
A. Consistency with Traditional Agency Deference 
The INA is ambiguous with respect to the procedure for 
identifying a crime involving moral turpitude.232 Courts facing an 
ambiguous statute, like the INA, must defer to the reasonable 
interpretation of the statute by the agency charged with the statute’s 
                                                 
 224. See Dadhania, supra note 29, at 340-46. 
 225. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 695 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2008), 
vacated, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550. 
 226. See infra Part III.  
 227. See supra Part II (discussing the varying procedures of the federal 
circuit courts in identifying a crime involving moral turpitude).  
 228. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 695.  
 229. See infra Section III.A.  
 230. See infra Section III.B. 
 231. See infra Section III.B. 
 232. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 693 (acknowledging that the INA 
does not define the procedure for identifying crimes involving moral turpitude).  
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administration.233 Since (1) the INA is ambiguous on the procedure 
for identifying a crime involving moral turpitude; (2) the legislative 
history of the INA does not clarify the intent of Congress on the 
procedure for identifying a crime involving moral turpitude; and (3) 
the BIA’s adoption of Mukasey’s procedure for identifying a crime 
involving moral turpitude would result in a procedure that is 
reasonable and not “arbitrary and capricious,” the BIA should 
embrace Mukasey’s procedure for identifying a crime involving 
moral turpitude.234 
1. The Text of the INA Is Ambiguous on the Proper Procedure  
The text of the INA does not resolve the issue of what 
procedure to utilize in identifying a crime involving moral 
turpitude.235 Several federal circuit courts interpret the moral-
turpitude-inadmissibility provision and other provisions within the 
INA in a way that allegedly reveals the unambiguous intent of 
Congress to (1) foreclose an inquiry into an alien’s conduct; and (2) 
prohibit an examination of evidence beyond the conviction record.236 
Nevertheless, the analyses of these provisions by the federal circuit 
courts rejecting Mukasey’s procedure (Rejecting Circuits) are 
flawed.237 As a result, the text of the INA remains ambiguous on the 
procedure for identifying a crime involving moral turpitude.238 
                                                 
 233. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 
967, 980 (2005) (“If a statute is ambiguous, and if the implementing agency’s 
construction is reasonable, Chevron requires a federal court to accept the agency’s 
construction of the statute . . . .”); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect 
to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is 
based on a permissible construction of the statute.”); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 
Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983) (“[A] reviewing court 
may not set aside an agency rule that is rational, based on consideration of the 
relevant factors, and within the scope of the authority delegated to the agency by the 
statute.”).  
 234. See infra Subsections III.A.1-2. 
 235. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 693. 
 236. See, e.g., Silva-Trevino v. Holder, 742 F.3d 197, 201 (5th Cir. 2014); 
Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 481 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 237. See infra Subsections III.A.1.a-b.  
 238. See infra Subsections III.A.1.a-b. 
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a. Erroneous Interpretation of the Moral-Turpitude-
Inadmissibility Provision 
In interpreting the INA’s moral-turpitude-inadmissibility 
provision, the Rejecting Circuits utilized erroneous reasoning.239 The 
moral-turpitude-inadmissibility provision states that “any alien 
convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits 
committing acts which constitute the essential elements of a crime 
involving moral turpitude” is inadmissible.240 The Rejecting Circuits 
utilized erroneous reasoning in interpreting the moral-turpitude-
inadmissibility provision because the Fourth Circuit impermissibly 
utilized judicial policymaking in its interpretation,241 the traditional 
canons of construction oppose the Rejecting Circuits’ 
interpretation,242 and “a crime involving moral turpitude” is not a 
term of art.243  
The Fourth Circuit utilized erroneous reasoning by relying on 
judicial policymaking in interpreting the moral-turpitude-
inadmissibility provision.244 Contrary to the Fourth Circuit’s 
assertion, the moral-turpitude-inadmissibility provision is composed 
of one part, not two parts.245 The provision contains an assortment of 
three prerequisites; at least one of these prerequisites must be present 
for a finding of a crime involving moral turpitude.246 That is, the alien 
has to (1) be convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude; (2) 
admit committing a crime involving moral turpitude; or (3) admit 
committing acts that constitute the essential elements of a crime 
                                                 
 239. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 699 (interpreting the moral-
turpitude-inadmissibility provision as permitting extrinsic evidence in immigration 
proceedings).  
 240. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2012). 
 241. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
864-65 (1984) (discussing the policy behind judicial deference to agency action, 
which includes the fact that agencies are experts in their respective fields). 
 242. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 87, at 12-14 (discussing the various 
canons of construction).  
 243. See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 227 (1951) (avoiding the 
classification of “a crime involving moral turpitude” as a term of art).  
 244. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864-65. 
 245. See § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (“[A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits 
having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential 
elements of . . . a crime involving moral turpitude . . . is inadmissible.”). But see 
Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 481 (4th Cir. 2012) (reasoning that 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) is split into two parts: one addressing moral turpitude admissions 
and one addressing moral turpitude convictions). 
 246. See § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i).  
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involving moral turpitude.247 There is nothing in the provision, or in 
the INA, to suggest that these three prerequisites should be grouped 
into two categories.248 The Fourth Circuit’s grouping of these three 
prerequisites into two categories, one addressing moral turpitude 
admissions and one addressing moral turpitude convictions, is an 
attempt to camouflage judicial policymaking.249 That is, concerned 
over the potential unfairness of a factual approach, the Fourth Circuit 
grouped these three prerequisites into two categories in order to 
fabricate additional support for rejecting Mukasey’s procedure.250 
Judicial policymaking is contrary to the policy behind judicial 
deference to agency action; the policy encourages agencies, not 
courts, to partake in policymaking due to agency expertise in the 
specific areas of law.251 As such, the Fourth Circuit utilized erroneous 
reasoning when it relied on judicial policymaking in interpreting the 
moral-turpitude-inadmissibility provision.252 
The traditional canons of construction further demonstrate that 
the Rejecting Circuits are erroneous in their interpretation of the 
moral-turpitude-inadmissibility provision.253 For example, the Fourth 
Circuit’s grouping of the three prerequisites in the moral-turpitude-
inadmissibility provision into two categories is contrary to noscitur a 
sociis.254 This is because admitting the commission of a crime 
involving moral turpitude and admitting the commission of acts that 
constitute the essential elements of a crime involving moral turpitude 
                                                 
 247. Id.  
 248. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 692-93 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2008), 
vacated, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2015). 
 249. See Prudencio, 669 F.3d at 481. In interpreting 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) as a two-category provision, the Fourth Circuit argued that 
Mukasey’s emphasis on “committing acts” appears only in the section addressing 
admissions. Id. Therefore, the court reasoned, since Silva-Trevino dealt with a 
conviction, not an admission, Mukasey’s finding of statutory ambiguity was 
misplaced. Id.  
 250. See id. at 484 (asserting that the “potential unfairness of the factual 
approach is daunting”). 
 251. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
864-65 (1984) (“Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, 
but not on the basis of the judges’ personal policy preferences.”). 
 252. See id. 
 253. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 87, at 12-14.  
 254. See Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 36 (1990) (identifying 
noscitur a sociis as a canon of construction prompting that “words grouped in a list 
should be given related meaning” (quoting Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 
114-15 (1989))).  
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seem to prompt a factual inquiry beyond the record of conviction.255 
For example, admissions may not always be accompanied by a 
record of conviction.256 Nevertheless, an admission, even absent a 
record of conviction, supports inadmissibility under the moral-
turpitude-inadmissibility provision.257 As such, per noscitur a sociis, 
the prerequisite that an alien must be convicted of a crime involving 
moral turpitude also seems to invite a factual inquiry beyond the 
record of conviction.258 The Fifth Circuit is correct in its inclusio 
unius argument259 that the INA explicitly allows extrinsic evidence in 
other sections of the INA.260 Nevertheless, this argument is not 
dispositive on the intent of Congress on the proper procedure for 
identifying a crime involving moral turpitude because the Fifth 
Circuit’s interpretation is only one of several reasonable 
interpretations of the moral-turpitude-inadmissibility provision.261 
Furthermore, interpreting the provision in a way that renders the use 
of extrinsic evidence permissible does not violate the “constitutional 
avoidance” canon.262 Congress’s ability to use extrinsic evidence in 
identifying a crime involving moral turpitude remains unquestioned 
by the Supreme Court.263 Because the Supreme Court is reluctant to 
find constitutional violations in immigration law, it is unlikely that 
the Supreme Court will determine the use of extrinsic evidence in 
identifying a crime involving moral turpitude unconstitutional.264 
                                                 
 255. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 699 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2008), 
vacated, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2015). 
 256. Id. 
 257. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) (2012). 
 258. See Dole, 494 U.S. at 36.  
 259. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 648 (2010) (identifying inclusio unius 
as a canon of statutory construction, which specifies that to include one item is to 
exclude other similar items).  
 260. See Silva-Trevino v. Holder, 742 F.3d 197, 201 (5th Cir. 2014) (arguing 
that the INA explicitly permits the use of extrinsic evidence in 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(7)(B), which states that the immigration judge “shall consider any 
credible evidence” (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(7)(B))).  
 261. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 698-99 (interpreting the moral-
turpitude-inadmissibility provision as permitting an inquiry into extrinsic evidence).  
 262. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) (specifying that the 
constitutional avoidance doctrine prompts the court to refrain from interpreting a 
statute in a way that would render the statute unconstitutional).  
 263. See Sanchez v. Holder, 757 F.3d 712, 720 (7th Cir. 2014); Bobadilla v. 
Holder, 679 F.3d 1052, 1056 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 264. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896) (specifying 
that the immigration power of Congress is extraordinarily broad); Bosniak, supra 
note 38, at 1090 (“[T]he single most salient feature of the government’s immigration 
power is the fact that it is substantially unconstrained as a constitutional matter.”); 
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Therefore, the traditional canons of construction demonstrate the 
Rejecting Circuits’ erroneous interpretation of the moral-turpitude-
inadmissibility provision.265 
Additionally, the Rejecting Circuits misinterpret the phrase 
“crime involving moral turpitude” in interpreting the moral-
turpitude-inadmissibility provision.266 To counter the idea that 
“involving” in “crime involving moral turpitude” dictates an inquiry 
into the facts, the Third Circuit and the Fourth Circuit made the 
assertion that “crime involving moral turpitude” is a term of art.267 To 
support this assertion, both circuit courts relied on De George.268 
Nevertheless, while the Court in De George did acknowledge the 
deep roots of the phrase “a crime involving moral turpitude” in 
United States jurisprudence, the Court did not classify this phrase as 
a term of art.269 The Court in De George also used “involving moral 
turpitude” to modify “crime” in the decision, which further discounts 
the notion that a crime involving moral turpitude is a term of art.270 If 
a crime involving moral turpitude was a term of art, then the Court 
would have used the phrase consistently throughout the decision.271 
Despite the reliance of the Third Circuit and Fourth Circuit on De 
George, the decision does not establish that “a crime involving moral 
turpitude” is a term of art.272 The Rejecting Circuits’ analysis of INA 
provisions outside of the moral-turpitude-inadmissibility provision is 
also erroneous.273 
                                                                                                       
Stumpf, supra note 30, at 1572 (recognizing that Congress’ immigration power is 
“unrestrained by constitutional limitations”). 
 265. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 87, at 12-14.  
 266. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 693, vacated, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550 
(Op. Att’y Gen. 2015). 
 267. Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 481 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The participle 
‘involving’ cannot be divorced from the unitary phrase ‘crime involving moral 
turpitude.’”); Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 477 (3d Cir. 2009) (asserting 
that a crime involving moral turpitude “refers to a specific class of offenses, not to 
all conduct that happens to ‘involve’ moral depravity”). 
 268. Prudencio, 669 F.3d at 481; Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 477. 
 269. See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 227 (1951). 
 270. Id. at 232 (“Whatever else the phrase ‘crime involving moral turpitude’ 
may mean in peripheral cases, the decided cases make it plain that crimes in which 
fraud was an ingredient have always been regarded as involving moral turpitude.” 
(emphasis added)).  
 271. See id. 
 272. See id.  
 273. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 692-93 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2008), 
vacated, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2015) (acknowledging that provisions 
outside of the moral-turpitude-inadmissibility provision permit an inquiry into 
extrinsic evidence in immigration proceedings).  
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b. Erroneous Interpretation of Other INA Provisions 
The Rejecting Circuits’ analysis of INA provisions outside of 
the moral-turpitude-inadmissibility provision contains several 
errors.274 In interpreting the moral-turpitude-inadmissibility 
provision, the Rejecting Circuits primarily focused on the INA’s 
definition of “conviction” and the INA’s list of criminal-conviction 
documents.275 Errors in the Rejecting Circuits’ analysis of provisions 
outside of the moral-turpitude-inadmissibility provision stem from 
the misinterpretation of both the INA’s definition of “conviction”276 
and the INA’s list of criminal-conviction documents.277 
First, the Rejecting Circuits misinterpret the INA’s definition 
of “conviction.”278 The INA’s definition of “conviction” as a “formal 
judgment of guilt” does not dictate what procedure may be used in 
identifying a crime involving moral turpitude.279 Defining 
“conviction” simply defines one of the three prerequisites in the 
moral-turpitude-inadmissibility provision for a finding of a crime 
involving moral turpitude.280 Even if the definition of “conviction” 
did have an impact on the procedure for identifying a crime 
involving moral turpitude, the provision defining “conviction” is 
disjunctive.281 A “conviction” is not always “a formal judgment of 
guilt.”282 A “conviction” also occurs when (1) adjudication of guilt is 
withheld; (2) the alien admits sufficient facts for a finding of guilt; 
and (3) the judge orders a restraint on the alien’s liberty.283 Thus, the 
                                                 
 274. Id. 
 275. See, e.g., Silva-Trevino v. Holder, 742 F.3d 197, 201 (5th Cir. 2014); 
Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 480 (3d Cir. 2009).  
 276. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(48)(A) (2012). 
 277. See id. § 1229a(c)(3)(B). 
 278. See id. § 1101(48)(A). 
 279. See id.; see also § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i). 
 280. See id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i). 
 281. See id. § 1101(48)(A). The statute reads: 
(48)(A) The term “conviction” means, with respect to an alien, a formal 
judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court, or if adjudication of guilt 
has been withheld, where – 
(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a 
plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to 
warrant a finding of guilt, and  
(ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or 
restraint on the alien’s liberty to be imposed. 
Id. 
 282. See id. 
 283. Id.  
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definition of “conviction” sheds no insight on the procedure for 
identifying a crime involving moral turpitude, which is contrary to 
the Rejecting Circuits’ conclusion that the definition prohibits a fact-
based inquiry.284 
Second, the Rejecting Circuits misinterpret the INA’s list of 
criminal-conviction documents.285 The fact that the INA provides a 
list of documents constituting proof of a criminal conviction does not 
prohibit the use of extrinsic evidence in adjudicating a crime 
involving moral turpitude.286 Section 240(c)(3)(B) of the INA begins, 
“any of the following documents or records . . . shall constitute proof 
of a criminal conviction.”287 The section does not read, “[only] the 
following documents or records . . . shall constitute proof of a 
criminal conviction.”288 Even if the list was exclusive in terms of 
what may constitute proof of a criminal conviction, the purpose of 
this list is to identify the criminal offense the alien committed, not to 
classify whether the criminal offense was a crime involving moral 
turpitude.289 Therefore, the Rejecting Circuits’ analysis of provisions 
outside of the moral-turpitude-inadmissibility provision is flawed.290 
The Rejecting Circuits utilized erroneous reasoning in 
interpreting both the INA’s moral-turpitude-inadmissibility provision 
                                                 
 284. See id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i). 
 285. See id. § 1229a(c)(3)(B). 
 286. See id.  
 287. Id. 
 288. See id. But see Silva-Trevino v. Holder, 742 F.3d 197, 201 (5th Cir. 
2014) (claiming that 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(B) contains “no mention of any 
additional evidence” and “the introductory phrasing, ‘any of the following 
documents or records,’ gives no indication that extrinsic evidence is contemplated” 
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(B))).  
 289. Ali v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737, 743 (7th Cir. 2008). To clarify, the 
Seventh Circuit explained:  
Section 1229a(c)(3)(B) does not include presentence reports among the 
documents that the agency may use to determine what crime [the alien] 
committed. That is not, however, how the agency used the report. The 
judgment of conviction itself contains what is required to that end (the 
crime is conspiracy to defraud the United States, in violation of § 371). 
The agency used the presentence report to ensure that the judgment was 
not a mistake (in other words, to ensure that there really was deceit, rather 
than just a conspiracy to violate a record-keeping law) and to make the 
moral-turpitude classification, a matter that stands apart from the elements 
of the offense. 
Id. 
 290. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 692-93 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2008) 
(interpreting the INA provisions as supporting a fact-based approach). 
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and the other provisions within the INA.291 As a result, the text of the 
INA remains ambiguous on the procedure for identifying a crime 
involving moral turpitude.292 In addition to the ambiguity within the 
text of the INA, the legislative history of the INA does not clarify the 
intent of Congress for the procedure for identifying a crime 
involving moral turpitude.293 
2. The Legislative History of the INA Is Ambiguous on the 
Proper Procedure 
Much like the text of the INA, the legislative history of the 
INA is not clear on Congress’s intent in terms of the procedure for 
identifying a crime involving moral turpitude.294 On the one hand, the 
legislative history of the INA does not reject a fact-based 
procedure.295 On the other hand, the legislative history of the INA 
supporting a fact-based approach is from a previous version of the 
INA, which decreases its value as persuasive authority.296  
The legislative history of the INA does not reject Mukasey’s 
fact-based procedure.297 As the Third Circuit mentioned, it does not 
appear that there is anything in the legislative history of the INA to 
suggest a fact-finding role for the BIA or the federal circuit courts.298 
Nevertheless, it also does not appear that there is anything in the 
legislative history of the INA that prohibits a fact-finding role by the 
BIA or the federal circuit courts.299 Thus, although the legislative 
history of the INA does not explicitly dictate that federal circuit 
courts and the BIA should use the fact-finding approach, the 
legislative history of the INA also does not explicitly dictate that 
federal circuit courts and the BIA should not use the fact-finding 
approach.300 Next, the position of the Fifth Circuit and Eleventh 
Circuit on congressional inaction, that Congress would have 
amended the INA if it supported a fact-based approach, is 
                                                 
 291. Id. 
 292. See id. 
 293. See infra Subsection III.A.2.  
 294. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 692-93, 700. 
 295. See id. at 700 (arguing that restricting the moral turpitude analysis to 
either the statute or the record of conviction is not compelled by the INA). 
 296. See Moore, supra note 62, at 675-76 (discussing the repeal of JRAD). 
 297. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 693, vacated, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550 
(Op. Att’y Gen. 2015). 
 298. See Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 476 (3d Cir. 2009).  
 299. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 693. 
 300. See id. 
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unpersuasive.301 Using the logic of the Fifth Circuit and Eleventh 
Circuit, Congress would have amended the INA if it supported the 
federal circuit court approach of excluding extrinsic evidence.302 
Furthermore, due to the size of Congress and the magnitude of 
legislation in Congress, it is difficult for Congress to pass and to 
amend legislation.303 Although the legislative history of the INA does 
not reject the use of a fact-based approach, the legislative history of 
the INA supporting a fact-based approach is outdated.304  
Although the legislative history of the 1917 Immigration Act 
supports the position that Congress intended a fact-based procedure 
for identifying a crime involving moral turpitude, the persuasive 
authority of this legislative history is limited because the legislative 
history is derived from a previous version of the INA.305 In the 
legislative history of the 1917 Immigration Act, Congressman Sabath 
aimed to prevent the deportation of aliens who committed a crime 
and who did not know, prior to executing the crime, that the crime 
was a crime involving moral turpitude.306 Similarly, Congressman 
Mann sought to prevent deportation as a sanction for petty crimes 
involving moral turpitude.307 Since Congress repealed the ability of 
judges to prevent deportation for criminal convictions when it issued 
the 1990 version of the INA, the persuasive authority of Congress’s 
early intent to utilize a fact-based inquiry is limited.308 The repeal of 
judicial ability to prevent deportation for criminal conviction limits 
judicial discretion; meanwhile, Mukasey’s fact-based procedure 
                                                 
 301. See Eskridge, supra note 94, at 98-99 (indicating that congressional 
inaction is a poor indication of congressional intent). But see Silva-Trevino v. 
Holder, 742 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 2014) (reasoning that Congress would take 
affirmative action if it supported a fact-finding procedure); Fajardo v. Att’y Gen., 
659 F.3d 1303, 1309 (11th Cir. 2011) (asserting that Congress could have “easily” 
amended the statute if it supported a fact-finding procedure).  
 302. See Silva-Trevino, 742 F.3d at 202; Fajardo, 659 F.3d at 1309. 
 303. See Eskridge, supra note 94, at 98-99. 
 304. See supra Section I.B (describing the legislative history of the 1917 
Immigration Act). 
 305. See Moore, supra note 62, at 675-76.  
 306. 53 CONG. REC. 5169 (1916) (statement of Rep. Adolph Sabath) 
(explaining that his goal is to protect the alien who “without thinking and without 
really knowing it is an offense, does something which may be designated technically 
as a crime involving moral turpitude”). 
 307. Id. (statement of Rep. James Mann) (asserting that the concern of aliens 
being deported for petty crimes involving moral turpitude was taken care of by the 
provision in the bill which forbid deportation if the judge who entered the sentence 
disagreed with the deportation).  
 308. See Moore, supra note 62, at 675-76. 
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would increase judicial discretion because the third step permits 
judges to determine the admissible evidence in each respective 
case.309 The lack of guidance in the legislative history of the INA and 
the discounted support of the fact-based approach in the legislative 
history of the 1917 Immigration Act results in ambiguity on the 
procedure for identifying a crime involving moral turpitude.310 Due to 
the ambiguity in both the text and the legislative history of the INA, 
the BIA should embrace Mukasey’s reasonable interpretation of the 
proper procedure.311 
3. The BIA’s Adoption of Mukasey’s Procedure Would Not Be 
Unreasonable or “Arbitrary and Capricious” 
The BIA should adopt Mukasey’s procedure for identifying a 
crime involving moral turpitude because the BIA’s adoption would 
be reasonable and not “arbitrary and capricious.”312 When an 
agency’s interpretation is reasonable and not “arbitrary and 
capricious,” federal circuit courts are obligated to defer to the 
agency’s interpretation.313 The BIA’s adoption would be reasonable 
and not “arbitrary and capricious” because Mukasey, in articulating 
his procedure, considered all relevant factors, including (1) statutory 
authority and public policy; and (2) the ineffective and irrational 
procedures of federal circuit courts for identifying crimes involving 
moral turpitude.314 Furthermore, recent Supreme Court precedent 
does not undermine the fact that BIA adoption of Mukasey’s 
procedure would be reasonable and not “arbitrary and capricious.”315 
The BIA’s adoption of Mukasey’s procedure would be 
reasonable and not “arbitrary and capricious” because Mukasey 
                                                 
 309. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 690 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2008), 
vacated, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2015) (specifying that in the third step 
of his three-part procedure, “judges may, to the extent they deem it necessary and 
appropriate, consider evidence beyond the formal record of conviction”).  
 310. See id. at 692-93.  
 311. See infra Subsection III.A.3. 
 312. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 704; Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 
Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
 313. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 42-43 (stating that an 
interpretation is not “arbitrary and capricious” when it is “rational, based on 
consideration of the relevant factors, and within the scope of the authority delegated 
to the agency by the statute”).  
 314. See supra Section II.B (explaining the rationale for Mukasey’s 
procedure for identifying crimes involving moral turpitude).  
 315. See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1682 (2013); Carachuri-
Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 570 (2010).  
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considered statutory authority and public policy.316 Mukasey asserted 
that he had the power to create a procedure for identifying a crime 
involving moral turpitude pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1).317 Next, 
noticing the varying approaches of the BIA and the federal circuit 
courts for identifying a crime involving moral turpitude, Mukasey 
identified that his purpose in establishing the procedure was to create 
a uniform standard.318 He reasoned that a uniform standard was 
needed because immigration law often has severe consequences.319 
The Fifth Circuit’s claim—that Mukasey’s procedure is counter-
productive to his stated purpose because there was a general unity 
among federal circuit courts in rejecting extrinsic evidence prior to 
Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino decision—is erroneous.320 Prior to 
Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino decision, the Seventh Circuit 
unambiguously used extrinsic evidence in its procedure for 
identifying a crime involving moral turpitude.321 Furthermore, in 
Valansi, the Third Circuit vacated a final order of removal and 
granted a petition for review, which implicitly granted an 
opportunity to investigate facts beyond the conviction record.322 Even 
if Mukasey’s procedure was counter-productive to his stated purpose 
of unity, Mukasey had another purpose: justice.323 If Mukasey merely 
wanted uniformity, then he could have concluded his procedure at 
the categorical approach; however, Mukasey advocated for the fact-
based procedure in order to ensure that those aliens who do commit 
                                                 
 316. See supra Section II.B. 
 317. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 688-89, vacated, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550 
(Op. Att’y Gen. 2015) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1)(2006)). Section 1103(a)(1) 
states that the “determination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all 
questions of law shall be controlling.” 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1).  
 318. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 694.  
 319. Id. For a discussion of the severe consequences of immigration law, see 
Legomsky, supra note 162, at 513.  
 320. See Ali v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737, 742 (7th Cir. 2008) (acknowledging 
that classifying a crime involving moral turpitude may require an inquiry into 
additional information because the charging papers are not created for purposes of 
such classification). But see Silva-Trevino v. Holder, 742 F.3d 197, 205 (5th Cir. 
2014) (identifying a consensus among the federal circuit courts in rejecting extrinsic 
evidence before Mukasey’s Silva Trevino decision).  
 321. See Ali, 521 F.3d at 743 (permitting the use of information beyond the 
record of conviction).  
 322. See Valansi v. Ashcroft, 278 F.3d 203, 217-18 (3d Cir. 2002) (granting 
a petition for review due to an inability to resolve a discrepancy between an 
indictment and a plea colloquy).  
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crimes involving moral turpitude do not avoid deportation merely 
due to loopholes in the law.324 Lastly, after considering the potential 
unfairness of investigations beyond the conviction record, Mukasey 
concluded that his procedure would not be unfair to aliens because 
“[t]he sole purpose of the inquiry is to ascertain the nature of a prior 
conviction; it is not an invitation to relitigate the conviction itself.”325 
In addition to considering statutory authority and public policy, 
Mukasey considered the existing procedures of federal circuit courts 
for identifying a crime involving moral turpitude.326 
The BIA’s adoption of Mukasey’s procedure for identifying a 
crime involving moral turpitude would be reasonable and not 
“arbitrary and capricious” because Mukasey addressed the 
ineffective and irrational designs of the federal circuit court 
procedures for identifying a crime involving moral turpitude.327 The 
procedures of federal circuit courts often resulted in either an under-
inclusive application of inadmissibility for a crime involving moral 
turpitude or an over-inclusive application of inadmissibility for a 
crime involving moral turpitude.328 In addition, Mukasey dismissed 
the application of Taylor and Shepard—Supreme Court cases 
rejecting an inquiry into extrinsic evidence in the context of 
recidivist enhancements in criminal proceedings—to immigration 
law.329 First, unlike recidivist enhancements in criminal law, 
immigration law is civil, and the Sixth Amendment does not apply.330 
Second, unlike recidivist enhancements in criminal law, an 
investigation of the record of conviction in immigration proceedings 
will not usually resolve an inquiry, in this case identifying a crime 
involving moral turpitude, because the record of conviction is not 
                                                 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. at 703.  
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 329. Id. at 700-01 (citing Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005); 
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990)).  
 330. Id.  
 Embracing Silva-Trevino 259 
framed for immigration purposes.331 In terms of administrative 
backlog resulting from an inquiry into extrinsic evidence, the 
Attorney General and the BIA, not federal circuit courts, are experts 
on priorities in immigration law.332 Although the Seventh Circuit and 
the Eighth Circuit did not provide extensive reasoning for adopting 
Mukasey’s procedure, the two circuit courts did accept the expertise 
of the Attorney General and the BIA.333  
Recent Supreme Court precedent does not disturb the fact that 
the BIA’s adoption of Mukasey’s procedure would be reasonable and 
not “arbitrary and capricious.”334 Although Holder asserted that 
recent Supreme Court decisions “cast doubt on the continued 
validity” of Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino decision,335 those recent 
decisions address deportability for aggravated felonies rather than 
inadmissibility for crimes involving moral turpitude; that is, in those 
recent decisions, the Supreme Court addressed a statutory provision 
of the INA distinct from the statutory provision of the INA Mukasey 
addressed in his Silva-Trevino decision.336 While 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) renders “any alien convicted of, or who admits 
having committed, or who admits committing acts” of a crime 
involving moral turpitude inadmissible,337 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) renders “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an 
aggravated felony” deportable.338 Although 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) could be interpreted as foreclosing a fact-based 
inquiry,339 interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) as foreclosing a 
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fact-based inquiry would be contrary to the explicit terms of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i).340 Thus, the BIA’s adoption of Mukasey’s 
procedure would be reasonable and not “arbitrary or capricious.”341  
Adoption of Mukasey’s procedure by the BIA would be 
reasonable and not “arbitrary or capricious” because Mukasey 
considered all relevant factors in creating his procedure for 
identifying a crime involving moral turpitude.342 Furthermore, recent 
Supreme Court precedent does not disturb the fact that the BIA’s 
adoption of Mukasey’s procedure would be reasonable and not 
“arbitrary and capricious.”343 Aside from adopting Mukasey’s 
interpretation of the procedure for identifying a crime involving 
moral turpitude due to the ambiguity of the INA, Mukasey’s 
consideration of all relevant factors, and the absence of conflicting 
Supreme Court decisions, there are practical reasons for the BIA to 
adopt Mukasey’s procedure.344  
B. The Practical Benefits of Mukasey’s Procedure 
The current disparity among federal circuit courts in terms of 
the procedure for identifying a crime involving moral turpitude 
results in grave consequences for the alien population of the United 
States.345 Adopting Mukasey’s procedure would demystify the 
procedure for identifying crimes involving moral turpitude and 
would prevent manipulation within the criminal system.346 Both of 
these externalities would result in an equitable solution.347  
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1.  Demystifying the Procedure for Identifying a Crime 
Involving Moral Turpitude  
The BIA should adopt Mukasey’s procedure for identifying a 
crime involving moral turpitude because the approach would 
demystify the procedure for identifying a crime involving moral 
turpitude.348 Mukasey’s approach would demystify the procedure 
through the creation of a clear, uniform procedure.349 This clear, 
uniform procedure would result in equitable externalities for aliens, 
including the application of the same standard of removability, a 
reduced risk of erroneous deportation, and more effective legal 
representation.350 
a. The Clear, Uniform Procedure 
The BIA’s adoption of Mukasey’s procedure would demystify 
the procedure for identifying a crime involving moral turpitude by 
creating a clear, uniform process.351 Currently, an alien navigating 
through the immigration-court system for an alleged crime involving 
moral turpitude faces a labyrinth.352 First, the alien must be familiar 
with both the categorical approach utilized by the BIA and the 
categorical approaches utilized by the various federal circuit 
courts.353 While some aliens are able to discern the applicable 
categorical approach by investigating the procedure of the federal 
circuit court of their residence, incarcerated aliens may be 
transported and their immigration cases may be reassigned to 
different federal circuits based on prison-capacity levels.354 This 
creates great uncertainty in terms of which categorical approach will 
                                                 
 348. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 704 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2008), 
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ultimately be applicable to the alien.355 Second, even if an alien is 
familiar with the categorical approach utilized by the relevant federal 
circuit court, the alien will have to determine when, if ever, that 
federal circuit court utilizes the modified-categorical approach.356 If 
the relevant federal circuit court does utilize the modified-categorical 
approach, then the alien will have to determine what evidence the 
federal circuit court considers within “the record of conviction.”357 
Third, the alien must be aware of whether the relevant circuit court 
would consider extrinsic evidence.358 In stark contrast to the current 
maze of uncertainty that an alien must face in determining the 
applicable procedure for identifying a crime involving moral 
turpitude, Mukasey’s procedure establishes a clear standard.359 
Mukasey’s three-part procedure greatly simplifies the 
procedure by creating a clear, uniform approach.360 Under Mukasey’s 
approach, all courts apply the “realistic probability” categorical 
approach.361 If the categorical approach does not resolve the issue of 
whether the alien committed a crime involving moral turpitude, then 
the courts apply the modified-categorical approach by investigating 
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vacated, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2015). 
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the record of conviction, which is limited to “documents such as the 
indictment, the judgment of conviction, jury instructions, a signed 
guilty plea, and the plea transcript.”362 Third, if neither the 
categorical approach nor the modified-categorical approach resolves 
the issue of whether the alien committed a crime involving moral 
turpitude, then the courts may look beyond the record of 
conviction.363  
While the third step of Mukasey’s procedure leaves great 
discretion for courts in determining which factual evidence to use 
during the procedure, the third step is only reached if the question is 
not resolved in the first two steps.364 Furthermore, the third step is 
limited by the factual findings and determinations of the criminal 
proceedings.365 Even assuming arguendo that there is potential 
unfairness in investigating an alien’s crime beyond the record of 
conviction, as the Third Circuit argues,366 the Attorney General and 
the BIA have the plenary power to make findings on all issues of 
immigration law under the INA.367 Long-established Supreme Court 
precedent demonstrates that the plenary power of Congress often 
results in unjust, though permissible, consequences upon aliens.368 
Therefore, even if a factual inquiry into the alien’s crime is unfair, 
the plenary power of the Attorney General and the BIA on issues of 
immigration law under the INA permits such an inquiry.369 In 
addition to establishing a clear, uniform procedure, the BIA’s 
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adoption of Mukasey’s procedure would result in equitable 
externalities.370 
b. The Equitable Externalities 
The BIA’s adoption of Mukasey’s procedure for identifying a 
crime involving moral turpitude would result in equitable 
externalities for aliens, including the application of the same 
standard of removability, a reduced risk of erroneous deportation, 
and more effective legal representation.371 First, two aliens who 
commit the same crime should not be subject to two different 
standards of removability.372 The Supreme Court promotes 
uniformity in the application of federal law.373 Uniform application of 
immigration law is particularly important because it provides a 
foundation for the protection of alien rights, projects the views of the 
United States on immigration to other nations, and illuminates how 
the United States will interact with individuals from other nations.374 
While creating a uniform approach to identifying a crime involving 
moral turpitude may not resolve all circuit splits on issues of 
immigration law, it would be a step in the right direction.375 
Second, adopting Mukasey’s procedure for identifying a crime 
involving moral turpitude would reduce the risk of erroneous 
deportation.376 The current procedures of federal circuit courts result 
in aliens being deported for crimes that are not crimes involving 
moral turpitude.377 On the other hand, the current procedures result in 
aliens avoiding deportation even though the crimes of those aliens 
are crimes involving moral turpitude.378 Deportation has grave 
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consequences on aliens.379 These consequences may include 
separation from friends and family, loss of employment, loss of 
property, loss of government benefits, loss of personal identity, and 
bars to reentering the United States.380 Rather than permit aliens who 
commit crimes involving moral turpitude to remain in the United 
States due to loopholes in the law, while deporting aliens who do not 
commit crimes involving moral turpitude, immigration law should 
remain consistent with the unambiguous intent of Congress to deport 
aliens who commit crimes involving moral turpitude.381  
Third, the adoption of Mukasey’s procedure would result in 
more effective legal representation for aliens.382 Rather than forcing 
the alien to rely solely on precedent or on the record of conviction, 
which the alien is likely not capable of analyzing effectively, 
Mukasey’s procedure for identifying a crime involving moral 
turpitude would allow the alien to introduce factual evidence to 
prove that the alien did not commit a crime involving moral 
turpitude.383 Despite the Third Circuit’s concerns regarding practical 
difficulties and potential unfairness of investigating an alien’s crime 
beyond the record of conviction,384 Mukasey stipulated that the 
consideration of evidence beyond the conviction record is 
constrained by the factual findings and determinations of the 
criminal court.385 Furthermore, in terms of the administrative burden 
that may arise from the consideration of evidence beyond the 
conviction record, the agency, not the federal circuit court, is best 
positioned to determine the allocation of available time and resources 
for the prosecution of crimes under the INA.386 Next, even if aliens 
do obtain legal representation in an immigration proceeding, the 
varying standards may interfere with the defense council’s duty to 
inform the client of potential deportation consequences of pleading 
guilty to an alleged crime.387 In addition to demystifying the 
procedure for investigating a crime involving moral turpitude, which 
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results in significant equitable factors, Mukasey’s approach would 
prevent manipulation in criminal proceedings.388 
2. Avoiding Manipulation in Criminal Proceedings 
The varying approaches of federal circuit courts for identifying 
a crime involving moral turpitude provide a strong incentive for 
prosecutors in criminal court to leverage an alien’s potential 
removability in plea negotiations.389 Since the Rejecting Circuits 
prohibit an inquiry into the facts of a crime, the prosecutor may have 
the discretion, depending on the alien’s conduct leading up to the 
charge, to pursue a conviction under a statute that solely 
encompasses crimes involving moral turpitude.390 If an alien is 
convicted under such a statute, then the alien would likely be 
deported because a majority of federal circuit courts currently rely on 
circuit precedent to apply the “least culpable conduct test.”391 While 
not all criminal prosecutors have adverse incentives against aliens, it 
is clear that some prosecutors leverage their discretion in order to 
deport aliens who are viewed unfavorably by either the prosecutor or 
society.392 Furthermore, knowledgeable of the alien’s vulnerability to 
deportation due to the rejection of the fact-based approach by a 
majority of federal circuit courts, a criminal prosecutor may pursue a 
higher criminal sanction during criminal plea negotiations than the 
criminal prosecutor would otherwise.393 To eliminate bias and 
promote equal bargaining power during criminal plea negotiations, 
the BIA should adopt Mukasey’s three-part procedure for identifying 
a crime involving moral turpitude.394  
The text of the INA and the legislative history of the INA are 
ambiguous on the proper procedure for identifying a crime involving 
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moral turpitude.395 Furthermore, the BIA’s adoption of Mukasey’s 
procedure would be reasonable, not arbitrary and capricious,396 and 
equitable.397 Thus, the BIA should adopt Mukasey’s procedure for 
identifying a crime involving moral turpitude.398 
CONCLUSION 
The various procedures of federal circuit courts for identifying 
a crime involving moral turpitude have great consequences on the 
alien population in the United States.399 Since the rejection of 
Mukasey’s procedure for identifying a crime involving moral 
turpitude (1) promotes the disparate treatment of aliens; and (2) 
results in ineffective federal circuit court procedures that permit 
aliens to escape deportation despite committing crimes involving 
moral turpitude, the BIA should adopt Mukasey’s procedure.400 The 
BIA’s adoption of Mukasey’s three-part procedure for identifying a 
crime involving moral turpitude would (1) be consistent with 
traditional agency deference; (2) demystify the procedure of 
identifying crimes involving moral turpitude through the creation of 
a universal approach; and (3) avoid manipulations within the 
criminal system with respect to conviction records.401 While 
Mukasey’s procedure would not cure all procedural issues in 
identifying a crime involving moral turpitude, it would draw the BIA 
and federal circuit courts one step closer to overcoming the 
immigration-law labyrinth.402 
                                                 
 395. See supra Subsections III.A.1-2. 
 396. See supra Subsection III.A.3. 
 397. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 704.  
 398. See id.  
 399. See Legomsky, supra note 162, at 513. 
 400. See supra Part III.  
 401. See supra Part III. 
 402. See Lok v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 548 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 
1977).  

